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ABSTRACT 
 Cormac McCarthy’s novels are thought experiments in what it might mean to write 
posthuman works of fiction. In a close reading of three of his novels, Child of God, The 
Crossing, and The Road, this project reveals how McCarthy’s stories paradoxically unravel the 
dangerous human desire to make of our world a story. His characters, Lester Ballard, Billy 
Parham, and the boy, become posthuman as they live increasingly outside of narrative. Their 
existences extend beyond the page, in a radical intimacy with the world, evident in the haunting 
and elusive presences, and absences, of wolves, hawks, trout, and even the sun itself in these 
novels. McCarthy demonstrates how the reality of the world is “another world entire” from the 
written page and the humanist project. At the end of his novels, McCarthy would point us to an 
existence beyond the novel.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 1940: the world plunges into war. In September of that year, four blue-collar teenage 
boys rambling through the countryside with a dog stumble upon a cave that will change their 
lives, and humanity, forever. Marcel Ravidat and his friends discovered Lascaux’s famous cave 
paintings, an unparalleled and uniquely preserved archive of ancient artwork.  
 The story of the Lascaux discovery reads a lot like a Cormac McCarthy novel: a dog 
leads a boy into a fateful encounter with nature and history. Marcel Ravidat feels like a real-life 
Billy Parham. Furthermore, the historical moment of the Lascaux cave discovery aligns with that 
of McCarthy’s The Crossing, a novel set around 1941 between the World Wars (Wegner 73, 
Sanborn 134). Beyond the Lascaux discovery story, these paintings obscured for so many years 
in darkness bring to light all the things I wanted to investigate when I began writing on Cormac 
McCarthy’s novels. What does it mean to make art that testifies to the human’s place in this 
world? How might the animal factor into that place? Why and how do we create such art in the 
world? Furthermore, how do we create relevantly— as the hunting society did in those caves? 
How does the twentieth century and all it entailed transform what art means for us right now? 
Like the caves, Cormac McCarthy’s novels communicate something vital to us about how 
humanity fits in the larger landscape of life.1 
 In a particular Lascaux scene, art historians identify one of the first appearances of a 
figure that will later become quite common in art: a man (Kleiner 9). Between a rhinoceros and a 
bison, this stick figure man floats diagonally on the wall of a Lascaux well shaft. The Gardner 
                                                
1 To provide historical context for the European man’s relationship with the wolf, Wallis Sanborn references the 
Lascaux caves in Animals in the Fiction of Cormac McCarthy (131). 
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Art History textbook’s exposition of this painting draws our attention to some of the puzzling 
aspects of the scene, as well as its supposed significance in the history of art:  
 The position of the man is ambiguous. Is he wounded or dead? ...Which animal, if either, 
 has knocked the man down, if indeed he is on the ground? Are these three  images related 
 at all? Researchers can be sure of nothing, but if the painter placed the figures beside 
 each other to tell a story, then this is evidence for the creation of complex narrative 
 compositions involving humans and animals at a much earlier date than anyone had 
 imagined only a few generations ago. Yet it is important to remember that even if the 
 artist intended to tell a story, very few people would have been able to “read” it. …Like 
 all Paleolithic art, the scene in the Lascaux well shaft remains enigmatic. (Kleiner 9) 
First, we read that the man’s position in relation to his surroundings is, artistically speaking, 
ambiguous. I love this description because it can apply to more than compositional uncertainty; a 
man’s actual position in the world is an uncertain one. This ambiguity in the Lascaux man may 
be a statement as much as it is a question. Second, we read that this scene might be our first 
known example of a narrative composition about man and animal. The irony of such an 
observation is that the author here is drawing us a timeline of timelines; here is one of our 
earliest narratives in our narrative of humanity via art. But why should we draw this timeline in 
the first place? Third, we read that our chronological and physical disconnection from these 
deep, ancient caves keep them enigmatic to us. However, such mystery might not only be a 
product of our distance from this art, but also a necessary part of the questions of placement that 
art asks.  
 The Lascaux caves certainly show us that our artistic attempts to understand the world 
and ourselves in it are nothing new. I first encountered the caves on day one of an art history 
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survey my sophomore year of college. My professor led us from the caves’ more rudimentary 
figures all the way to the proclaimed glory of the Sistine chapel. My Art History 101 syllabus 
told me a story of linear progression, creative improvement. The professor did not say that the 
Sistine chapel was superior to the Lascaux caves, but she didn’t have to. We saw it in the order 
of her slides and I read it between the lines of my Gardner’s textbook.  
  But elsewhere I was learning something other than a story of progress. World Wars, 
trenches, Auschwitz, Darwin, Hiroshima and Nagasaki: these words each in their own way 
became for me synonymous with two realities I could not escape: namely, that human beings are 
capable of unpredictable, unimaginable violence and that human beings are far less central in the 
world than Descartes had made us think we were.  
 Posthumanism is a critical angle that emerged as early as the 1960s in the thinking of 
people like Michel Foucault, who writes: “As the archeology of our thought easily shows, man is 
an invention of recent date. And perhaps nearing its end” (quoted in Wolfe xii). Posthumanism, 
according to Cary Wolfe, “opposes the fantasies of disembodiment and autonomy, inherited from 
humanism itself” (xv). Wolfe reveals how humanism convinces us that to be human means to be 
something greater than the physical or animal body that we inhabit. “Posthumanism names a 
historical moment in which the decentering of the human…is increasingly impossible to ignore, 
a historical development that points towards the necessity of new theoretical paradigms” (xvi). 
But for Wolfe, we must not only recognize this decentering but also acknowledge the paradox of 
centering in the first place: because humanism’s values “are undercut by the philosophical and 
ethical frameworks used to conceptualize them” (xvi). In posthumanism, Wolfe seeks to bring to 
light the flawed, self-reflexive nature of humanist thought in order to refresh our understanding, 
for he knows we cannot escape our understanding altogether. His goal is summarized as follows:  
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 The perspective I attempt to formulate here…actually enables us to describe the human 
 and its characteristic modes of communication, interaction, meaning, social 
 significations, and affective investments with greater specificity once we have removed 
 meaning from the ontologically closed domain of the consciousness, reason, reflection, 
 and so on. It forces us to rethink our taken-for-granted modes of human experience, 
 including the normal perceptual modes and affective states of Homo Sapiens itself, by 
 recontextualizing them in terms of the entire sensorium of other living beings and their 
 own autopoietic ways of  “bringing forth a world”—ways that are, since we ourselves are 
 human animals, part of the evolutionary history and behavioral and psychological 
 repertoire of the human itself. (xxv) 
Coming from a more specific angle on these issues, N. Katherine Hayles in her book How We 
Became Posthuman chronicles how the advent of information technology has radically shifted 
the way we define ourselves. For Hayles, our current tendency is to see the body as the original 
prosthesis (3). We do not see embodiment as an essential part of being human. Hayles is 
interested in seeing re-embodiment. She wants us to “put back into the picture the flesh that 
continues to be erased in contemporary discussions about cybernetic subjects” (5).  
 A critical perspective that I will engage in its similarities to some forms of posthumanism 
is ecocriticism, particularly as it is practiced by author Timothy Morton. Morton suggests that 
Darwin’s discoveries have broad implications in the way we must see the world, though not 
necessarily the social implications that we fear. According to Morton, if we accept Darwin’s 
evolutionary idea of the world, everything we thought was concrete becomes an abstract process. 
So the horse we ride becomes simply a momentary expression of cells in flux, an abstraction 
instead of a reality. Morton explains:  
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 There is indeed something humiliating about this reversal of immediacy into abstraction, 
 in the same way Copernicus and Galileo brought humans down to Earth. …Evolution 
 strikes another great nail into the coffin of common sense. It is worth pausing briefly to 
 let this stunning conclusion sink in. We cannot see, touch, or smell evolution. It evades 
 our perception. (“The Mesh” 20) 
Morton goes on to explain, “All of this is profoundly antiteleological. …The lack of teleology is 
humiliating— literally, it brings us down to Earth, which must be good news for ecology” (22). 
Morton offers a vision of the world through the analogy of “the mesh,” which “does away with 
boundaries between living and nonliving forms” and emphasizes the interconnectedness of all 
things (22). Like posthumanism, ecocriticism would undo the categories we live in by 
“humiliating” the human being’s placement in the world against the backdrop of the natural 
world. Ecocriticism complements posthumanism because both movements would drastically 
transform our realities. Ecocriticism would transform us in light of natural processes and 
posthumanism would transform us through a totally new way of thinking (more precisely, “non-
thinking”) about who we are.   
 A few other thinkers add greater dimension to this conversation. Georges Bataille, Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari, and Jacques Derrida, all come into play in my posthuman reading of 
McCarthy. Bataille offers a vision of animal intimacy with the world through violence apart from 
individual human identity. Deleuze and Guattari provide a model of “becoming” that I use to 
more realistically describe what the characters in McCarthy novels are, as they are outside of 
traditional humanist categories. Derrida imagines how philosophy born from Descartes has 
underestimated the importance of the animal gaze in its understanding of humankind.  
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 I am not the first person to see how McCarthy’s novels join posthumanism’s work of 
radically shifting how limiting our visions of ourselves and the earth can be. Vereen Bell calls 
McCarthy’s tour de force Blood Meridian “a critique of our culture’s anthropocentrism” 
(Achievement 124). Dana Phillips goes a step farther, arguing that “Bell’s treatment of 
McCarthy’s style does not recognize how radically unanthropocentric it is” (“History and the 
Ugly Facts” 446). Phillips fleshes out how in McCarthy, we are not experiencing competition 
between human and natural but rather see how the human fits into the natural order (think 
Morton’s “mesh”).  Phillips explains that McCarthy writes within the sort of updated worldview 
that posthumanism calls for:  
 The favored discourses of the novel— religion, ethics, psychology, and politics—  suffer 
 the fate of most other humanist discourses when the anthropocentric view is abandoned. 
 So does nihilism. …Blood Meridian hints at a descriptive discourse which might capture 
 within its net religion, ethics, psychology, politics, and nihilism too, a discourse which 
 limits the outlines of the arena in which humans…contend without any vested interest in 
 the outcome. (“History” 452-453) 
Phillips recognizes that the posthuman context will affect the novel generically, as a traditionally 
humanistic enterprise. He outlines how a novel like Blood Meridian survives this shift by carving 
out a new space for a novel to exist in, one that does not offer judgment but just “rides on” 
through it all.  
 What does this new territory for the novel look like, according to Cormac McCarthy? 
Informed by the posthuman perspective introduced above, I will perform close readings of three 
novels to answer that question. Child of God, The Crossing, and The Road each represent 
different phases of McCarthy’s writing and thus they offer us a good cross-section of his work. 
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Timothy Morton predicts that art with updated perspective will become “about ‘unworking’ 
rather than about the precious work of art as such” (The Ecological Thought 105). I hope to show 
the radical unworking of the novel’s form that McCarthy’s novels are all about. His novels 
fiercely undo our prior definitions of what it means to be human. In the same vein as Cary 
Wolfe, McCarthy cuts all the way to the bone, questioning the very fact that we define ourselves 
in the first place. McCarthy offers us a taste of how art can dethrone the tyrannical reign of the 
human consciousness since Descartes in the face of the radiant power of the world.  
 In the haunting narration of The Road, McCarthy reflects on the forlorn position of art, of 
writing, in that apocalyptic time and place:  
 No sound but the wind. What will you say? A living man spoke these lines? He 
 sharpened a quill with his small pen knife to scribe these things in sloe or lampblack? At 
 some reckonable and entabled moment? He is coming to steal my eyes. To seal my 
 mouth with dirt. (261)  
Here, from within the limits of the posthuman artist, McCarthy imagines those limits. This is the 
giant paradox, present both in the philosophy of posthumanism and in the writing of Cormac 
McCarthy. Can we as humans escape humanist renderings of the world? Likewise, as Michael 
Chabon succinctly expresses in his review of The Road: “To annihilate the world in prose one 
must simultaneously write it into being” (2). In fact, as Chabon continues, the only way to 
imagine such a world apart from the human “would be a book of blank pages, white as ash” (2).    
 McCarthy boldly demonstrates how the reality of the world is indeed “another world 
entire” from the written page and the humanist project. As the endings of all three of these books 
communicate, these novels point us towards a world beyond the novel. What if a book’s most 
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poignant use might just be to imagine its own limitations? Novelistic self-destruction may be 
deeply paradoxical, but this does not mean it is any less real.   
 In what follows, I will read three of McCarthy’s novels as thought experiments in 
posthumanism. In McCarthy’s novel Child of God, Lester Ballard disrupts the normalcy that his 
Sevier County neighbors try to weave with their stories of him, as well as their stories of the 
world around them. Ballard’s ambiguity also undoes the readers’ categories for a protagonist. 
Ballard becomes a case study in what novels usually say the human is while McCarthy’s novel 
refuses to categorize Ballard as such. But Lester Ballard remains a proto-posthuman. Child of 
God hints at the radical self-destruction that McCarthy more fully realizes in the next two novels.  
 In The Crossing, McCarthy offers us characteristically stunning prose that appears to 
build a novel of traditional, humanistic meaning and identity. But beneath McCarthy’s own 
storytelling and behind the many stories within his larger plot, this novel opens up to a 
posthuman angle. The presence of the wolf, Billy Parham’s becoming wolf, and the embedded 
tales combine to give us a novel of posthuman scope.  
 In The Road, the most posthuman of McCarthy’s novels, he offers the character of the 
father as a promoter of the old humanistic order of life. Though the father tries to pass on to his 
son a linguistic understanding of the world in his older categories, the son escapes such 
categories. In the son, McCarthy portrays, within the inherent limits of the written page, what a 
posthuman existence could look like.   
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I. CHILD OF GOD:  
THE BEGINNINGS OF POSTHUMANISM IN LESTER BALLARD 
 It pains me to say this as I launch into my own piece of academic writing, but I have 
already forgotten a majority of the critical texts I have read thus far in graduate school. However, 
when I encountered this 1973 McCarthy novel in my postsouthern fiction seminar, the criticism 
included both dramatic proclamations and scathing denouncements. It was, in short, quite 
memorable. Two critics, Lewis Simpson and Walter Sullivan, situate McCarthy at “the end” of 
something with this book. Though their reactions to this novel and its shocking nature come 
through Southern lenses, I think these properties of Child of God become a good jumping-off 
point for a posthuman reading of this novel.  These critics push McCarthy into new and 
paradoxical turf, which is exactly where I want to meet him.  
 In Lewis Simpson’s tracing of Southern pastoral, he forecasts that a stage of literature 
approaches that will dispossess the Southern Renaissance itself, in “a shifting of the terms of the 
controlling conflict in the Southern literary imagination” (90). In 1975, when Simpson predicts 
this, he closes by announcing that this shift “has not quite occurred yet, and the literary 
imagination will continue no doubt to find ways to imagine its own survival” (100).  
 In the same year that Simpson chronicles this shift, another critic, Walter Sullivan, 
describes a similar trajectory. Sullivan does not attempt to hide his feelings concerning this 
chapter-close in Southern literature, and his final chapter’s title, “Rainbow’s End,” gives us a 
clear idea of where Sullivan’s good opinion lies. Like Simpson, Sullivan laments the loss of a 
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humanistic value system that offers boundaries, though traversable, to previous works of 
Southern literature. Sullivan predicts a course of self-destruction for the modern Southern author, 
arguing that art cannot survive “the destruction of nature and society” (70). Sullivan specifically 
targets Child of God and accuses McCarthy of committing this artistic suicide with his 
“destructive impulse” (71).  
 In their final forecasts, neither Simpson nor Sullivan seems to have it quite right. 
Simpson closes with the assumption that the authorial imagination will troop along and make its 
usual meaning nonetheless in the approaching twenty-first century. Sullivan sees art as doomed 
when it loses a traditional value system and the system’s accompanying language. But 
McCarthy’s novels would undercut both predictions.  
  Sullivan writes that “in the destruction of nature and society, art itself is destroyed” (70). 
What Sullivan means as criticism sounds strikingly similar to a moment of creative vision in 
McCarthy’s novel The Road: “Perhaps in the world’s destruction it would be possible at last to 
see how it was made” (274). Likewise, McCarthy’s character Lester Ballard collects his first 
female corpse in the apparent hope that “he would see how she were made” (92). McCarthy 
seems to require destruction in order to create or build anything. While Simpson invests hope in 
the everlasting literary imagination, McCarthy sees the potential breakdown of such human 
imaginings. Sullivan says that with the loss of a value system comes the death of art. Yet few 
would argue that McCarthy’s novels are anything less than art. Regardless of whether Sullivan is 
right or wrong, his proclamation begs the question I am very interested in asking: what, then, is a 
modern artist like McCarthy up to?  
 In Child of God, Sullivan might actually be right: McCarthy commits artistic suicide. 
McCarthy plunges us into a violent man’s story and forces us to come to terms with how we 
   
     11 
need to undo our old definitions of the human. In Lester Ballard, McCarthy gives us a character 
who falls farther and farther out of sync with his community as he begins to murder women and 
collect their corpses. McCarthy, through Lester Ballard, explodes our categories for 
understanding our experience. Child of God reveals the inadequacy of our current definition of 
the human. Child of God acts in continuity with Wolfe’s vision for posthumanism, which “forces 
us to rethink our taken-for-granted modes of human experience” (Wolfe xxv). In Lester Ballard’s 
existence and in the inadequacy of Sevier County definitions, McCarthy moves us outside our 
known boundaries of the “human.”  
 What Lester Ballard is doing in Child of God is not summed up in words like necrophilia, 
murder, or loneliness. Rather, Ballard is shedding his humanity. His violent rituals, which look 
like attempts to be more like his human neighbors, are really attempts to stop being human. 
While Ballard eventually returns to human community, he does momentarily experience a 
posthuman existence of intimate belonging in the world.  
 This intimacy with the world is a concept at the center of Georges Bataille’s text Theory 
of Religion. For Bataille, our human problem is our distance from the world, in contrast to what 
he sees as animals’ intimacy with the world. Immanence is what we long for: “If man 
surrendered unreservedly to immanence, he would fall short of humanity…and eventually life 
would return to the unconscious intimacy of animals” (53). Just as McCarthy’s creative impulse 
seems forever manifested in destructive form, so Bataille sees a link between a return to the 
intimacy he desires and violence: 
  The deep affirmation of sacrifice, the affirmation of a dangerous sovereignty of 
 violence, at least tended to maintain an anguish that brought a longing for intimacy to an 
 awakened state, on a level to which violence alone has the force to  raise us. (77) 
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To Bataille, even religion itself is fundamentally a search for our lost intimacy (57). Ritualized 
violence wakes us up to the dawn of an existence that is less individualistic or humanistic, and 
more animal in its relation to the world.  
 Just as Bataille appeals to the existence of what we call “animal” to describe how we 
need to update our identity, so Deleuze and Guattari also discuss the animal as they think outside 
the box about identity in A Thousand Plateaus. Moving beyond binary narrative definitions of 
“man” and “animal” that exist in terms of progress or regress, Deleuze and Guattari offer up a 
more nomadic style of definition: “a becoming.” In fact, “becoming” is less a definition than a 
description. When writing on “becoming animal,” Deleuze and Guattari discuss such a becoming 
as a way to examine an idea without fencing it off in a crippling fashion. For them: “The history 
of ideas should never be continuous; it should be wary of resemblances, but also of descents or 
filiations; it should be content to mark the thresholds through which an idea passes” (235).  
 Bataille, Deleuze and Guattari offer us a vocabulary necessary to execute a posthuman 
reading. Wielding some of these terms, I might more accurately suggest that we will follow 
Ballard’s becoming, as violence and humiliation lead him to a moment of existence where he 
belongs to the world. However, Child of God is a fledging thought experiment in the posthuman. 
Lester Ballard does not achieve a posthuman existence, leaving us to wonder whether such an 
existence is possible, and if so whether a novel can present it.   
 Vereen Bell and Diane Luce are two McCarthy scholars who offer a good introduction to 
my reading of Child of God. In his chapter entitled “The Ambiguities of Innocence,” Bell brings 
to light the homelessness, isolation, and immature humanity of Lester Ballard. While Bell’s 
insightful analysis of Child of God generally remains in a traditional humanist context, he 
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references some groundbreaking aspects of this novel which I intend to draw out in my chapter. 
When analyzing Ballard’s death, Bell writes:  
 We are most aware of Lester’s humanness at the point at which it is irrevocably 
 extinguished, and through that paradox McCarthy causes the status of humanness  itself 
 to seem intolerably ambiguous and frail—nugatory even, in the unimplicated, insentient 
 otherness of the world. (68)  
Twenty-four years ago, Bell was already alluding to what I am calling the posthuman elements 
of McCarthy’s novel. What he sees as the inconsequential humanness in Child of God is 
something I wish to address more fully.  
 Dianne Luce discusses Child of God in her 2009 book Reading the World: Cormac 
McCarthy’s Tennessee Period. Here Luce analyzes Child of God by setting the book up against 
actual cases of murder and necrophilia, occurring around the same time that McCarthy was 
writing the novel. Luce explains how McCarthy might have used these cases as source material. 
Luce also draws parallels between Alfred Hitchcock’s film Psycho and McCarthy’s novel. She 
concludes by noting that Lester Ballard’s final emergence from the caves and return to the 
hospital leave him “unenlightened” (175).  
 Bell’s final commentary that the status of the human is ambiguous, even inconsequential, 
links nicely to Luce’s final comment that Ballard remains “unenlightened.” If we remove the 
negative bias from the word “unenlightened,” we can use these two readings to begin our 
posthuman reading of McCarthy’s novel. Ballard’s humanity is “nugatory” and he is 
“unenlightened,” and for both of these reasons, readers must reevaluate what it means to be 
human in the first place. By reading Sevier County’s storytelling as a humanist activity, we 
watch Lester Ballard’s otherness bring us towards the posthuman.  
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 Bell and Luce both draw out a compassionate response to the character of Lester Ballard. 
Bell accomplishes this by noting how Ballard is made out of our own human insecurities. Luce 
sees McCarthy’s unbiased gaze at this criminal as inviting our sympathy: “By looking 
dispassionately at Ballard’s life, McCarthy invites us to see him compassionately” (Luce 151). In 
my reading of Lester Ballard, I hope go beyond a compassionate response to a response that is 
not necessarily devoid of compassion but different in scope: something Morton might call 
“kinship,” and Bataille might call “intimacy.”  
 One noteworthy moment in Luce’s chapter is her account of the Wisconsin necrophile Ed 
Gein, a murderer and collector of dead bodies whose story contributed to the creation of 
Hitchcock’s infamous Norman Bates in Psycho. After Gein’s arrest, Methodist minister Kenneth 
Engelman visited him in his jail cell. Engelman explained his visit to the press in what follows:  
 I’m a Christian minister and Mr. Gein is a child of God. …God may be nearer to Mr. 
 Gein than the rest of us because God comes closer to people in dealings with life and 
 death. Mr. Gein is closer to such things that the rest of us. (Quoted in Luce 146) 
Engelman’s words provide a meaningful entry point into the novel. Engelman unflinchingly 
declares that this man, who robbed graves to collect dead bodies for incomprehensible purposes, 
is a child of God. Furthermore, Engelman attributes a kind of superiority to Gein, whose 
struggles may bring him closer to God than the rest of us. McCarthy may not present Ballard as 
existing in closer proximity to the divine, but his portrait of Ballard should be even more 
disorienting to readers than Engelman’s portrayal of Gein as God’s child. As Engelman does in 
his description of Ed Gein, so McCarthy will take Lester Ballard outside of our preconceived 
judgments. Beyond Engelman, McCarthy suggests that Ballard is not wholly child, man, divine, 
animal, story, or storyteller; he is another being altogether. And Ballard’s ambiguous status, 
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rather than being a liability, leads him to a momentarily harmonious belonging, a closing of the 
gap between himself and the world, in a manner that humanistic meaning inhibits.  
 
Who is Lester Ballard? 
“Some halt in the way of things seems to work here. See him.” 
 
 From the cover of the book, the conceit of McCarthy’s title forces us to grapple with 
what it means to be a human being. Readers first encounter the title’s phrase when McCarthy 
introduces us to Lester Ballard:   
 He is small, unclean, unshaven. He moves in the dry chaff among the dust and slats of 
 sunlight with a constrained truculence. Saxon and Celtic bloods. A child of God much 
 like yourself perhaps. (4) 
Here we see how Ballard’s physical presence does not fit into the world around him. We watch 
him move through the dust and sunlight without that aura of novel’s protagonist. Already 
McCarthy communicates to us that Ballard is seen and unseen. Ballard is a paradox of 
“constrained truculence,” latent cruelty. He is in conflict with the people around him. Ballard 
watches the goings on in his hometown, his home even, from a distance. He is ghost-like, 
otherly. Ballard’s ancestry, his “Saxon and Celtic” past, alludes to an identity based in human 
history and society. But such ancestry already rings emptily like the auctioneer’s voice in the 
background of this scene: “In the pines the voices chanted a lost litany” (6). The fact that Ballard 
is Saxon or Celtic means nothing to the rest of Child of God. Finally, in a line that gains 
significance when read in the context of the rest of the novel, we are implicated in Lester 
Ballard’s fate: “A child of God much like yourself perhaps” (4).  
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 Unless you are reading this from your cell on death row, we can assume that the 
commonality McCarthy initially posits between Ballard and us is at least slightly disturbing to 
readers. But this potential for kinship is the essential glue for the rest of novel. Without it, we as 
readers are tempted to judge, laugh at, or at least maintain an apathetic distance from Ballard, as 
his neighbors do, and as we are wont to do with a novel’s main character. With it, we must carry 
on with him until the end, knowing that our fate might be connected to his.  
 Furthermore, to be a child of God requires relinquishing a fully human status. If Lester 
Ballard is a child of God, he is something other than human. But then, we cannot know whether 
Ballard has such a divine heritage. That “perhaps” tacked to the end of such a surprising 
supposition gives McCarthy and readers a maddening freedom. McCarthy undercuts his own 
proposition with a winkingly ambiguous word. Because of this “perhaps,” we do not assume that 
Lester Ballard is our fellow sibling in God’s family. We do not assume divine ordinance of his 
existence. Instead McCarthy forces us to investigate what sort of a being Lester Ballard might 
be. Then the larger question looms beyond the “perhaps:” who are we?   
 Another way to put the central question of Child of God is this: how do we take the 
Western Judeo-Christian conception of man as unique child of God, implied by the title, and take 
an evolutionary understanding of humanity as part of earth’s processes and reconcile one or the 
other of these in the creature that is Lester Ballard? Answering this proves difficult, for Lester 
Ballard ultimately resists both understandings. In asking such a question, McCarthy’s novel 
blazes new territory because he reveals the flaws in such limiting definitions. Doctor-turned-
author Walker Percy observes that the  
   
     17 
 two traditional Western ways of thinking about man, the Greco-Judeo-Christian and the 
 scientific-organismic, may presently do us a disservice. …They may conceal more than 
 they reveal. (Percy 113) 
McCarthy, like Percy at least in this moment, sees that a dualistic understanding of man is 
insufficient. But McCarthy would move radically beyond Percy to posit that all ways of thinking 
about the human, not just these two, do us a disservice. More specifically, McCarthy shows how 
our way of thinking about the human through the vehicle of the novel is wildly inadequate. Alan 
Bourassa argues that the novel “stakes a claim to a definition of the human” (3). Bourassa goes 
on: “The human is but the creation of a system of meanings and values that must in large part be 
called literary” (18). Thus we can define our word “human” as a literary category, a system of 
meaning that comes out of our narrative of the world. Bourassa lists what he sees as the central 
concepts in the novel’s definition of the human, including emotion, inwardness, individuality, 
experience, and meaning (3-15).  
 As we witness Ballard’s struggle to place himself in the world of humanistic identity, 
both as the protagonist of a narrative and as a resident of Sevier County, we see that such 
placement is impossible. Ballard consistently resists the novel’s and his neighbors’ attempts to 
define him, which is why he tends to strike readers as one of the oddest protagonists ever to 
grace the page. In what follows, I want to show how Child of God reveals the failures of such 
“ways of thinking” about Lester Ballard as a novel’s kind of being. Then I hope to reveal how, 
within the novel, Lester Ballard’s community parallels McCarthy as they unsuccessfully attempt 
to contain Ballard in their stories.  
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 In contrast to Bourassa’s definition of the human of novels, Ballard is a being devoid of 
emotion and inwardness. The novel does not allow us to enter into Ballard’s thoughts or his 
feelings, keeping us from investing in him as we might want to invest in a traditional protagonist. 
McCarthy accomplishes this on the simplest level by never opening Ballard’s mind to us as 
readers. McCarthy offers precious few insights into Ballard’s inner world, leading us to almost 
suspend our belief in the interiority of Lester Ballard. Interiority, as Bourassa sees it, comes most 
often in twentieth century novels through a “stream of consciousness” (8). This is entirely absent 
from Child of God. McCarthy leads us through Ballard’s life of eating baloney sandwiches, using 
the outhouse, collecting female corpses, tramping listlessly through creeks, snow, mountains, 
prisons, and stores. Ballard does no thinking, musing, and little dreaming to which we are privy.  
As the novel advances and Ballard’s murders accumulate, no blush of guilt appears. Ballard 
never evinces sorrow over his activities.  
 Granted, McCarthy offers us a few moments in the novel when Ballard seems to have 
Bourassa’s human category of inwardness. We read that as “he watched the diminutive progress 
of all things in the valley, the gray fields coming up black and corded under the plow, the slow 
green occlusion that the trees were spreading,” Ballard is reduced to tears (170). But should we 
read his tears as guilt, sorrow, or loneliness? McCarthy does not lead us to any of these 
conclusions. Perhaps in Ballard’s tears he joins the creek he sees in the valley, sinking into 
Bataille’s desired intimacy with his surroundings. McCarthy gives little reason to see in Lester 
Ballard the emotion or interior life that a novel’s human character usually possesses.  
 Ballard’s experiences do not additively make him a novel’s human center. Bourassa 
outlines the way a hero like Homer’s Odysseus experiences things that teach readers what to 
expect, and not expect, from him in the future (12). But with Lester Ballard, we have no 
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paradigm of experience in which to read him. McCarthy does include various Sevier County 
citizens’ narratives of Ballard’s past. However, these do not come to us as his experiences, but 
rather as their stories (more on this later). Odysseus’s classic story revolves around a journey 
home, and the experiences that move him closer or further from home. In contrast, Ballard’s 
story is a parody of a journey, and home is a space that forever eludes him.  
 If a human being is a creature with a home in the world, then Ballard is not human. Child 
of God opens with the repossession of Ballard’s home and land by the county. After he is kicked 
off what was once his property, Ballard tries to take up residence in an empty cabin in the woods. 
He sweeps it and drags his possessions there till “he had all he owned about him in the barren 
room” (15). But in little time, Ballard’s cabin is overrun with foxhounds, who trample him and 
undo the trappings of his home, “carrying first the muntins,2 then the sash, leaving a square and 
naked hole in the wall” (24). As the foxhounds reveal, the other creatures of the world refuse to 
recognize Ballard’s home as distinct from the space they inhabit. Later in the novel, Ballard 
wakes in the night to find this cabin on fire: “Through the rives in the boards above him he could 
see a hellish glow of hot orange” (104). Ballard narrowly escapes being burned alive. He 
stumbles out into the snowy night to watch the flames consume the place he called “home,” 
though McCarthy will give it no such fixed title: “Long before morning the house that had kept 
Ballard from the elements was only a blackened chimney with a pile of smoldering boards at its 
feet” (105). Ballard collects his corpses and brings them into a new “home” in the caves, but 
from here he is arrested and imprisoned. No space offers Ballard respite. When his experiences 
are lined up together, they read more like a non-voyage, coupled with the loss of homes, rather 
than the classic novel’s journey home. 
                                                
2 Muntins are those cross-bars that hold together panes in a window.  
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 If the human being is a creature separate from the animal, then Ballard is not human. 
McCarthy consistently uses our vocabulary of “the animal” to describe Ballard. Ballard gives the 
carnival worker a “cold cat’s look” (62). Ballard listens to his own echoing voice “with his head 
tilted like a dog” (132). He pokes his head up through a hole in the mountain “like a groundhog” 
(155). He howls in the cave and makes “a sound not quite crying that echoed from the walls of 
the grotto like the mutterings of a band of sympathetic apes” (159). Ballard becomes a “crazed 
mountain troll” (152). When he awakes in the hospital he is “a part-time ghoul” (174). In his 
final wanderings in the caves, Ballard “scrabbled like a rat” (188). When Ballard encounters a 
cat early in the novel, then narrator remarks: “The cat looked at him without interest. It seemed 
to think him not too bright” (26). In an ironic turn of ordinary definitions, Lester Ballard sinks 
further below the human, lower than the traditional “other” of the animal. 
 If human existence is one defined by relationships, then Ballard is not human. As Ballard 
watches two hawks, we hear that “He did not know how the hawks mated but he knew that all 
things fought” (169). Mating is certainly beyond Ballard’s grasp, as evidenced by the 
necrophilia. As Ballard violently kills and collects female corpses, his practices divorce sexuality 
from human relationship. Ballard seeks physical continuity with others, but he does so without 
metaphysical connections to his fellow creatures. In so doing, he defies existence based on 
rational or relational connection in favor of violent, physical connections.  From Bataille’s 
perspective, Ballard’s violent rituals may in fact be raising him to that awakened state of intimate 
belonging to the world.   
  If all of these descriptions of Ballard strike us as ultimately puzzling, then I think we are 
reading him correctly. Somehow, outside of all these categories we call human, Ballard exists. In 
a moment when a flooded creek threatens to carry Ballard away, a narrator interjects to wonder 
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why Ballard is saved from such wrath: “How then is he borne up? Or rather, why will these 
waters not take him?” (156) And that is the largest question, addressed to the waters of this creek 
and the novel’s current, too. How does Ballard cohere in the enterprise of the novel? As his 
community grows increasingly suspicious of Ballard’s different behavior, a law enforcement 
officer gives Ballard two options: “You are either going to have to find some other way to live or 
some other place in the world to do it in” (123). But McCarthy hints at a third option for Ballard, 
an explanation as to how he is “borne up:” becoming posthuman. The river’s water proves itself 
to be capable of erasing old human categories, and bringing continuity. What is buoyed up in the 
flooded river is the posthumanism of Lester Ballard.3  
 Ballard finds a kind of belonging in the world, an existence, though it is not the one we 
usually imagine. Ballard’s collection of female bodies, both discovered and gathered through 
murder, along with his necrophilia, distance him from expected human behavior. His violence 
raises him to a level of continuity with the world not unlike that of the animal. Late in the novel, 
an angry mob of townspeople forces Ballard to lead them to where he has stashed these bodies. 
Ballard brings them to the caves, but once inside, he separates himself from the group and 
disappears in the caves. In Ballard’s escape from his vigilante kidnappers, the earth’s caves 
initially appear to offer respite to him. The townsmen are at a total loss in the caves, showing that 
they are not in control in this natural environment. But Ballard ends up as lost as his neighbors. 
Ballard wanders through the caves with a flashlight, stopping to sleep and then waking only to 
wander on. He collects a tooth from a jaguar skull like a tourist, and then he realizes that his own 
body will be subjected to such a fate: “Perhaps [mice would] nest in his skull, spawn their tiny 
bald and mewling whelps in the lobed cavern where his brains had been” (189). His human 
                                                
3 Ballard is born up in the creek much like the trout are standing in the stream at the end of The Road.  
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existence seems destined to dissipate into a habitat for mice. The parody of a home that Ballard 
built in the caves parallels the home that the mice will build in the caverns of Ballard’s body. 
Here we see Lester Ballard as a being of physical matter to be repurposed and used even after his 
own consciousness ends. In these caves, Ballard sees that the world is not built as a home for 
men. Ironically, he is more “at home” in this vision of his death than he has ever been in his life.  
  In The Animal That I Therefore Am, Jacques Derrida meditates on the gaze of the animal 
upon the naked human: “The gaze called ‘animal’ offers to my sight the abyssal limit of the 
human” (12). While the actual animal gaze is something the next two novels will bring into the 
conversation, Ballard’s time in the caves spent becoming animal is his fullest realization of the 
limitations of the human. Here deep in the cave, a space free from stories and human boundaries, 
he comes closest to a posthuman existence. Perhaps this is why the narrator offers Ballard this 
strange compliment while he wanders in the caves: “He was half right” (189).  
 Though Sevier County never accuses or tries Ballard for his activities, he spends the rest 
of his days imprisoned in a state hospital, where his neighboring prisoner is “a demented 
gentleman” accused of cannibalism (193). In giving such a genteel title to Ballard’s fellow 
prisoner, McCarthy subtly mocks such traditional human categories, for neither this man nor 
Ballard qualify as “gentlemen.” Caged and ignored save when he is “taken out for airing,” 
Ballard eventually dies after contracting pneumonia (193). For McCarthy though, death is not the 
end of Lester Ballard. Upon his death, his body travels to the state medical school in Memphis, 
where students dissect him.  
 His entrails were hauled forth and delineated and the four young students who bent over 
 him like those haruspices of old perhaps saw monsters worse to come in their 
 configurations. (194) 
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Over the spread of Ballard’s organs, these medical students transform into something other than 
scientists. Haruspices were ancient religious men who examined the remains of animal sacrifices. 
In a more general sense, haruspices look at destructed matter for some kind of significance. The 
medical students attempt to see in Ballard’s cells, ribs, and arteries that human potentiality, 
interiority, and meaning Bourassa sees as central to the novel. The medical students look in the 
matter for new monsters, but perhaps they miss what is really there. Ballard’s matter may decay, 
not into new monsters, but into the home for mice he imagines himself to be in that posthuman 
awareness in the caves. The medical students haul forth and delineate Ballard’s entrails much 
like Ballard once studied and engaged dead bodies. We too have this desire to find meaning in 
the human existence, which is why we dissect and why we write novels. Ballard’s dissection 
under the scalpels and saws of the medical students parallels Ballard’s dissection in McCarthy’s 
pen. Neither successfully captures Ballard’s real existence.   
 
Sevier County’s Stories 
“I’ll tell ye another thing he done one time” 
 After commenting on Lester Ballard’s rifle, a Sevier County man recounts his own trip to 
a Newport carnival, where he encounters an ape in boxing gloves, whose owner offers fifty 
dollars to anyone who can stay in the ring with him for three minutes (58). Egged on by his 
friends and whiskey, he volunteers to get in the ring with the gorilla, thinking “Well hell. He 
ain’t big as me” (59). Circling the gorilla and showing him “a little footwork,” the man 
successfully punches the animal twice and feels confident that he will win this fight. He 
describes what follows:  
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 Well, well, how sweet it is. I’d done spent the fifty dollars. I ducked around and went to 
 hit him again and about that time he jumped right on top of my head and crammed his 
 foot in my mouth and like to tore my jaw off. I couldn’t even holler for help. I thought 
 they never would get that thing off of me. (59-60) 
The outcome of the exchange between man and beast is not the only surprise in this story. The 
very entrance of this man into the trapped environment of the gorilla reverses the way Sevier 
County cages Lester Ballard for his violence against their community. Indeed, Ballard is twice 
placed in a cage in the novel (54, 193).  
 Morton writes: “Humans maintain the human-animal boundary by erecting rigid walls 
made of quasi-humans, humanoids, ambiguous nonhumans, or unhumans” (The Ecological 
Thought 88). Boundaries are how Sevier county citizens deal with animals, and eventually with 
Lester Ballard. Morton’s boundaries here are scientific ones. I think McCarthy adds to Morton’s 
point in Child of God by revealing the way that humans erect boundaries to maintain their 
superiority through stories.  
 Child of God alternates between narrative sections about Lester Ballard and narrative 
sections following the sheriff or the general happenings in Sevier County. Among these narrative 
sections McCarthy inserts vignettes, colorful with the dialect and imaginings of people from 
Sevier County. These vignettes are told in the first person, and the reader quickly realizes that 
they generally begin or end in conversations about Lester Ballard.  
 McCarthy’s inclusion of these stories is an interesting way to grow his protagonist, the 
“child of God.” McCarthy could explain Ballard’s family and past through Ballard’s own 
memory, or through “objective” narration. Instead, he defines him through the community’s 
collective consciousness. The sum total of their stories is a sense of superiority, or at least 
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differences from Lester Ballard. In this way, the stories stand in opposition to the commonality 
that McCarthy’s title/conceit offers. The stories keep Ballard as “other” from Sevier County 
society, refusing to recognize continuity between them and him.   
 A flood is a force capable of erasing boundaries that separate and define physical spaces. 
Floods eliminate, at least from the larger view, fences, rivers, and roads, bringing the world into 
a united whole. Beyond just physical topography, the water of the flood that occurs in Child of 
God also undoes man-made boundaries in Sevier County, just as we see the river’s water holds 
Lester Ballard. The flood reconfigures roads into rivers, upon which we watch the law 
enforcement of the county ride in boats. Sheriff Fate and his deputy make cracks about giving 
tickets to speeding motorboats rather than cars. The sheriff quips, “You ain’t seen an old man 
with a long beard building a great big boat anywheres have ye?” (161).  In their jokes and 
conversation, the flood “becomes simply another aspect of the daily routine and is absorbed into 
the reassuring authority of the normal” (Bell 56). Fate feigns linguistic control over a force far 
beyond his control.  
 The ways the citizens of Sevier County use stories, words, and histories reveal, to use 
Bell’s phrase, the “unfailing human capacity for suppression and evasion” (58). This community 
ignores continuity in their reality in order to maintain what they see as distinction; they escape 
that intimate belonging with the world through their stories. Humanity’s attempts to suppress and 
evade stand in contrast to nature’s power to reveal. “In the spring or warmer weather when the 
snow thaws in the woods the tracks of winter reappear on slender pedestals and the snow reveals 
in palimpsest old buried wanderings, struggles, scenes of death” (138). In the snow’s melting, 
McCarthy’s universe tells its secrets: “Tales of winter brought to light again like time turned 
back upon itself” (138). This melting, like the flood, is an example of what we might describe as 
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naturally destructive or decaying processes that are, for McCarthy, revelatory and constructive. 
Flowing water embodies and reveals the continuity of reality, without superiority.  
 McCarthy shows that the people of Sevier County are neither superior to nor in control of 
their world. Rather, readers see the human activity in the novel as a small part of life. McCarthy 
construes the human activities that Sevier County’s citizens see as meaningful as puppeted acts. 
When Ballard walks into church, “The congregation…would turn all together like a cast of 
puppets at the opening of the door” (31). McCarthy also likens the party who goes to the cave to 
retrieve the bodies to “puppeteers” (196). The people of Sevier County are only masquerading as 
inhabitants of an orderly, controlled universe where justice is served. What we are really left 
with is an image of nature’s enduring watch over the affairs of men: “…basking nighthawks rose 
from the dust in the road before them with wild wings and eyes red as jewels in the headlights” 
(197).  
 Beyond Bell’s point that humans suppress and evade, McCarthy tells us that we do this 
not only in a negative and avoidable sense, but innately because of our epistemological 
limitations. Human stories shape their content, and if the only way we know is through such oral 
histories then our knowledge is forever limited. The stories undermine themselves with their 
continual anchoring in the collective or personal memory, not fact: “They say he never was 
right” (21); “I’ll tell ye another thing he done one time” (35);  “I’ll say one thing” (57); “They 
wasn’t none of em any account that I ever heard of” (80). This is exactly the circular reasoning 
that Wolfe warns against when he explains: “the world is an ongoing…construction and creation 
of shared environment…by autopoetic entities that have…their own forms of embodiment” 
(xxiv). As that final glimpse of the hawks’ eyes communicates, the human story may not be the 
final story.  
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 Morton addresses the problematic way human beings let the possession of a 
consciousness—as manifested in such activities as storytelling—sanction them to act in a 
superior manner:  
 We assume that consciousness is a special bonus prize for being more “highly 
 evolved”—a suspicious idea from a Darwinist point of view. …If we use science  only to 
 justify our superiority to other beings, the most we shall offer them is a condescending 
 sympathetic hand. (The Ecological Thought 73) 
Morton goes on to complicate this with the paradoxical reality that we cannot escape our 
consciousness:  
 Yet as soon as we try to exit the model that puts humans on top, we run into
 trouble. The ultimate philosopher of superiority was Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche threw 
 down a significant gauntlet: he reduced living to asserting mastery, and mastery to 
 domination. What happens when you try to rise above his argument? You fall prey to his 
 logic of mastery. Nietzsche’s idea eats away at all positions that strive to overcome it. 
 How do we get out of this trap? By crouching low and crawling away, like a sensible 
 small mammal. ...Consciousness then becomes a property of lowliness and weakness, 
 rather than of power. (The Ecological Thought 73) 
Morton explains that if we try to be above superiority, we are still falling into the superiority 
trap, and are inescapably living as Nietzsche thinks we are. Morton’s suggestion that the way out 
of the paradox is the way down is poignant to our discussion of the person of Lester Ballard. For, 
as Lester Ballard descends into caves and into violence that the human community seeks to 
contain and repel in their stories, he begins to participate more intimately with the world.    
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 In a surprising twist then, Lester Ballard may become a protagonist with something to 
teach us. The disturbing kinship linking him and us leads away from false domination of our 
surroundings and into a cave. In Lester Ballard’s emergence from the cave, we see a 
transformation in him. He is not repentant or redeemed in a religious sense, but he is reborn. 
When Ballard makes it back to the hospital, he is “a weedshaped onearmed human swaddled up 
in outsized overalls and covered all over with red mud” (192). Swaddled and covered in blood, 
Ballard appears to be a wild infant, born out of the earth. As Morton offers escape from human 
superiority through crouching low, Lester Ballard has his first and only identity epiphany in his 
submersion the ground. And in a significant word choice for me, McCarthy tells us that Ballard 
is “human.”   
 Ballard’s transformation is not just in his time in the cave, for he comes out only to 
encounter the same darkly combative world he knew before: “He cast about among the stars for 
some kind of guidance but the heavens wore a different look that Ballard did not trust” (190). 
What happens next though impacts Ballard. As a church bus passes him on the road, Ballard 
looks into the face of a small boy. Once the bus passes, McCarthy tells us:  
 He was trying to fix in his mind where he’d seen the boy when it came to him that 
 the boy looked like himself. This gave him the fidgets and though he tried to 
 shake the image of the face in the glass it would not go. (191)  
Why is this so significant for Ballard? I think, to again use Morton’s imagery, Ballard 
experiences literal humiliation, in his time in the caves and his encounter with the boy. He is 
brought low by an awareness of a kind of kinship to other lives. Perhaps it is a totally narcissistic 
kinship, as he sees himself in the boy. But for the first time, Ballard is continuous with another 
life form. When Ballard thinks of the boy as himself, he is able to see himself from the outside. 
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This thought experiment of getting outside one’s own consciousness is quintessentially 
posthuman. Ballard is the little boy and the little boy is Ballard; their lives both become part of 
the larger mesh that is life.  
 However, after he resurfaces and sees this boy, Ballard returns to human community. As 
the roosters herald dawn, a muddy and half-starved Ballard presents himself to the nurse at the 
hospital, announcing: “I’m supposed to be here” (192). He returns to the hospital, a choice that, 
were we an emotionally involved studio audience of readers, we would implore him not to make. 
Why does Ballard experience rebirth only to recommit himself to the hospital? Why must he 
“belong” there?  
 Although Lester Ballard consistently resists this novel’s confinement to the realm of the 
human, he returns to that community when he goes back to the hospital. The hospital is the 
source of the dissection that Ballard is eventually subjected to; the hospital, like the novel, 
propagates a limiting definition of his existence. Hospitals treat people based on a series of 
quantifiable, knowable facts and experiences. At least for now, McCarthy’s novel does not 
entirely escape the human. In Child of God, McCarthy does not seem ready to commit to the 
fullest implications of the ideas that he is entertaining. Can we blame him? Taken in full, 
posthumanism requires us to follow Lester Ballard outside of our literary, communal definitions 
of life. Becoming posthuman is not a comfortable process. As Child of God hints, and as the next 
two novels I examine reveal, to write posthumanly is to violently unwrite all that we know of 
ourselves. Child of God reads as McCarthy’s “warm-up” posthuman novel.   
 But Child of God still possesses these momentary flights into the posthuman. Child of 
God does share something with McCarthy’s more fully realized posthuman novel, The Road. In 
Ballard’s encounter with this little boy on a bus, McCarthy’s reader might see a foreshadowing 
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of a little boy we will meet in McCarthy’s latest novel. Towards the end of The Road, the father 
sees his son, “Standing with his suitcase like an orphan waiting for a bus” (275). On first glance, 
crass necrophile Lester Ballard would seem to have little in common with the gentle boy in The 
Road. But in this reading, both are orphans, pushed outside of old categories of identity, who 
must find a new way to exist. Both Ballard and the boy are experiments in life outside the 
traditional confines of language, history, and religion. Lester Ballard stands as a precursor to the 
little boy, who is our first fully fleshed-out posthuman character in McCarthy’s canon.   
 Ironically, an account of Ballard’s dream offers another moment of posthuman flight. 
Ballard dreams he is riding a mule along a ridge, gazing out over a grassy field of deer. We read:   
 Each leaf that brushed his face deepened his sadness and dread. Each leaf he passed he’d 
 never pass again. They rode over his face like veils, already some yellow, their veins like 
 slender bones where the sun shone through them. He had resolved to ride on for he could 
 not turn back and the world that day was as lovely as any day that ever was and he was 
 riding to his death. (171) 
Ballard may be riding a mule, but McCarthy uses the same word “ride” to describe the play of 
the leaves over his face. In a strange reversal, we sense that Ballard is not the only one riding. 
Leaves ride, too. Dominion subsides and mutuality prevails. McCarthy describes the “slender 
bones” of these leaves, and we sense the satisfaction that Ballard is finally glimpsing “what stuff 
they were made of, or himself” (139). His dream offers transparency and unity with his natural 
surroundings, answers to Ballard’s real longings, it seems. Ballard’s desire runs deeper than the 
need for home, family, romantic love, or work. Instead, Ballard has an abiding desire to belong 
in the world outside the confines of the human. Accompanying this clarifying stillness comes 
“sadness and dread” as Ballard is “riding to his death.” But clearly Ballard sees no point in trying 
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to escape death. He rides on, and recognizes the normalizing presence of the world: “the world 
that day was as lovely as any day.” This is the posthuman in Child of God: even in his dream, a 
realm of human subconscious, we see a man coming to terms with his smallness in the face of a 
resplendent world that pays no mind to his existence. Loveliness in the world comes coupled 
with death (“the world that day was…lovely…and he was riding to his death”) because only 
through the death of the “human” can we exist inside this loveliness (171).   
Final Thoughts: Tattoos and Novels 
 Lester Ballard wanders into the Sevier County post office, where he looks at a “Wanted” 
poster, and McCarthy tells us: 
 The wanted stared back with surly eyes. Men of many names. Their tattoos. Legends of 
 dead loves inscribed on perishable flesh. A prevalence of blue panthers. (55) 
These men’s tattoos show us how in spite of our othering of “the animal,” we still identify with 
animals. Child of God’s passing mentions of gang communities, with names like “panther,” 
reflect our need to move outside of human identity into a more animal one. These tattoos also 
reveal our desire to inscribe words in flesh. This flesh is described as perishable though, which 
cuts the significance of the “legends of dead loves” with the awareness that neither the lovers nor 
their ink remembrances will last. The tattoos have something in common with the novel. Novels 
are words imprinted into leaves, chronicling tales of human activity. Like the wanted men and 
their tattooed bodies, McCarthy teaches us that the novel’s days are numbered. The residents of 
Sevier County can tells stories all day, they can claim power over their history and their present, 
but readers leave unassured of such power. Instead, the futility of human existence strikes us as 
we watch the molded corpses lifted out of the caves in the novel’s last few pages.   
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 Still, McCarthy is a living, working novelist. In scribing this legend of the death of Lester 
Ballard, McCarthy’s work as author parallels the medical students’ work as haruspices. Both find 
meaning in the dead body for our future. McCarthy understands his need for the destroyed body, 
hence the “artistic suicide” that began this conversation. McCarthy creates and kills Lester 
Ballard in Child of God. McCarthy kills in order to reveal death as a transformation rather than 
an ending. He does this because, like Morton, he wants us to crouch low and crawl out of our 
current identity into an updated humanity that understands that we are simultaneously 
insignificant and connected to the world in which we live. We must learn that our stories do not 
end in superiority. Child of God closes not with an oral history or even an account of protagonist 
Lester Ballard. Child of God ends with those haunting red eyes. The final word becomes 
something other than a “human” word. 
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II. THE CROSSING: 
STORIES TO END ALL STORIES 
 In the previous chapter, I argued that in Lester Ballard and the stories of Child of God, 
McCarthy unravels what we know of the human. In form as well as content, Child Of God’s 
storytelling becomes increasingly impotent. Stories cannot explain or control Lester Ballard. 
Stories cannot contain the world. The hawks’ eyes lead us out of the human story and into 
something other than a story.  
 The Crossing, on the other hand, seems at first to affirm the idea of storytelling as a 
necessary and praiseworthy endeavor. The Crossing offers a recognizable hero in Billy Parham 
and his brother Boyd. Billy’s relationships with the wolf and with his brother are heart-warming 
and heart-breaking, neither of which are descriptions that lend themselves to Child of God. 
Within his pastoral context, Guillemin acknowledges the sentimentality of The Crossing which 
“exposes the novel to the charge of being invested with a false, hyperbolic pathos” (126). 
Bourassa writes that The Crossing is among McCarthy’s novels that “seem much more familiar, 
even to the point of being adventurous” (82). Bourassa posits: “In The Crossing we have all the 
elements for the building of a narrative line” (82).   
 Deeper than just the humanistic trappings of this novel, the stories within the larger story 
of Billy Parham also testify to the power of storytelling, basing a definition of the world upon it. 
As one storyteller who Billy encounters tells him: “For this world also which seems to us a thing 
of stone and flower and blood is not a thing at all but is a tale” (143). As Billy’s failed quest to 
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return the wolf to Mexico turns to a story of his subsequent wanderings, Billy’s story becomes 
almost submerged in the stories of the men and women he encounters as he wanders. Their tales 
offer a reading of Billy’s sufferings in a narrative pattern. So how do we reconcile these weighty 
stories with our posthuman reading of Child of God? And how do we read Billy Parham as 
something other than a traditional protagonist in a humanistic storytelling enterprise? Does 
Cormac McCarthy tear apart what we know about humanity and the world via the novel only to 
turn around and feed traditional definitions of these?    
 In spite of the weight and beauty of the stories that fill The Crossing, they are working in 
much the same way as the stories in Child of God. The Crossing’s storytellers use their tales to 
try to make sense of the suffering and death around them by allegorizing it. Stories are still an 
attempt to control (Guillemin 141). McCarthy proves himself capable of writing powerful, 
meaningful, humanistic narratives. But he goes on to reveal how his own narratives can actually 
inhibit our existence in the world unless they become something other than human, and thus not 
narratives at all.  
 The Crossing is dressed as a classic novel. But reading beneath the mesmerizing prose of 
the novel’s many storytellers, I think we find a new, posthuman bend to this book. In the 
presence of the wolf, Billy Parham’s “becoming wolf,” and the embedded tales, The Crossing is 
yet another thought experiment in what it might mean to write a posthuman novel.  
 
 At the beginning of The Crossing, the Parham men attempt to trap a wolf that is 
threatening their livelihood as she kills their cattle and roams their land. The Parhams seek the 
advice of more experienced trappers. One such trapper vocalizes his disdain for the 
anthropocentric world, and asks the Parhams to learn from the animal world. “The old man said 
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that no man knew what the wolf knew” (45). So Billy Parham seeks to remedy this: “He tried to 
see the world as the wolf saw” (51). This shifting in Billy’s outlook is crucial to understanding 
The Crossing.  
 How do we read the wolf in The Crossing? We may be tempted to use the wolf as a 
metaphor for something or an analogy to Billy’s other relationships. Certainly drawing 
comparisons between the human and animal is worthwhile and useful. In a similar method, 
Guillemin brilliantly reads how the character Lester Ballard manifests a “wilderness within” that 
matches “the wilderness without” (39). Like Guillemin, Scoones draws out the parallel between 
McCarthy’s characters and their environment. Writing on the border trilogy, Scoones suggests: 
 The three novels…reveal the profoundest correlations between the ways in which 
 humans construct their relationships with the natural world and the manner in which they 
 construct their relationships to each other. (137) 
Though his perspective is not that of a literary critic, Barry Lopez draws similar correlations 
between animal and human. Writing on Nunamiut society and wolves, Lopez supposes “a 
correspondence between the worlds of these two hunters” (86).  
 Dana Phillips is hesitant about drawing such parallels too quickly, lest they become 
conflations. Phillips communicates that “the possibility of ecocriticism does not hinge on the 
question of whether or not there is an inherent relation of resemblance between literature and 
nature” (144). Phillips actually references Barry Lopez’s concept of interior landscapes and 
exterior landscapes, and respectfully counters: 
 I can think of no compelling reason to accept the premise that we must establish and 
 maintain firm connections between our inner and outer worlds, which is to 
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 say….connections of likeness between those worlds, with likeness understood or rather 
 misunderstood as identity. (11) 
For Phillips, we are on thin ice when we try to establish our identity outside culture, technology, 
or modernity, in what we perceive to be the respite of nature. As he rightly prods: “Science, 
discovery, and technological achievement do not mark our final alienation from nature: they 
mark our ever greater involvement in it” (Truth 31). The ecocritical desire to redirect our gaze to 
the world is problematic because we are assuming a definition of “the world” as apart from the 
human.   
 I hope my analysis does not commit simplistic conflations of world and text. I do not 
want to argue that the wolf is a purer life form that the posthuman strives to be; that is far from 
what I see Lopez doing in Of Wolves and Men, and it is certainly not what McCarthy is doing. 
Instead the wolf is a category-exploding other. The wolf is not a parallel or alternate way to see 
the world, but a being that exists outside of our “sight.” If Billy does later become wolf, however 
briefly, this is because he loses his humanistic, narrativizing sight of the world.  
 Were we to read this novel as a traditional road story of cowboy Billy Parham’s fall from 
grace, there are a number of moments in the plot we might point to as the beginning of that fall. 
But Billy Parham’s real problem is not that he smuggles his family’s food to a stranger in the 
novel’s opening chapters. Nor is it his bold mission to free the wolf in Mexico. Billy does not 
lose his bearings because he desperately seeks to get back his father’s stolen horses. The 
Crossing is not a story of Billy’s fall but rather a picture of what results from his lapse in vision. 
For, when confronted with the wolf, Billy realizes that his eyes do not see the world entire. He 
senses his lack: “He tried to see as the wolf saw” (51). Billy’s efforts actually look a lot like the 
efforts of some posthuman scholarship. He tries to get outside of his human understanding and 
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into the wolf’s world when he tries to rescue her and take her home. His intentions are valid in 
that he longs to see something larger in the world than himself. But in such “seeing,” Billy 
inserts the wolf into a narrative. He tries to “read” the wolf into his story. He does not 
acknowledge the abyss between his eyes and the wolf’s, and the difference in what those eyes 
see.  Only after the wolf is dead by Billy’s own hands does he see this difference. Then Billy 
becomes wolf. Then the work of getting outside the human, and human language, begins.  
 Deleuze and Guattari’s term might help us understand McCarthy’s wolf: “becoming 
animal.” I want to talk about Billy and the wolf as a becoming. Billy becomes wolf, or at least he 
begins to. Perhaps the easiest way to explain how Deleuze and Guattari’s term operates is to say 
what it is not. Becoming animal does not imply progress, regress, correspondence, resemblance, 
or evolution proper. It is a creative process (239). “What is real is the becoming itself, the block 
of becoming, not the supposedly fixed terms through which that which becomes passes” (238). 
Reminiscent of Wolfe’s point that the posthuman may help us get at the human, here I want to 
wield Deleuze and Guattari’s term in order to get past these fixed terms (wolf, boy, conscious, 
sentient, compassionate, violent, hunter). The wolf helps us out of these categories in order to 
seek a definition that is refreshed and useful once again.4  
 In addition to Delueze and Guattari, Derrida adds helpful perspective in our look at Billy 
and the wolf. In Derrida’s The Animal That I Therefore Am, he philosophically unpacks the way 
Descartes’ model of existence excludes animals, and how this exclusion matters. What would it 
look like for philosophers to factor in the gaze of the animal? How might this change how we 
define ourselves? For Derrida, this is not only an ontological issue but a linguistic one. “The 
animal” is quite literally a word, “an appellation that men have instituted, a name they have 
                                                
4 Alan Bourassa also uses this idea of “becoming” in his analysis of The Crossing in his book Deleuze and American 
Literature. 
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given themselves the right and the authority to give the living other” (23). Thus, Derrida’s 
discussion flows meaningfully into McCarthy’s novels: how is the problem, the limit, of current 
human identity a product of human language? How might we write a new human identity, or 
unwrite the one we have now?  
 
Billy and Wolf 
 Leaving Grant County New Mexico behind, the Parham family travels to a freshly minted 
county to the south. Hidalgo County, where they make their new home, appears to be a 
boundless place: “You could ride clear to Mexico and not strike a crossfence” (3). “Crossings,” a 
word the title forces us to listen for, are obsolete in this expanse. But after the Parham family’s 
crossing-less journey and before Billy’s many crossings, we hear this: “The wolf had crossed the 
international boundary” (24). The she-wolf’s entrance into the novel introduces us to the 
presence of boundaries:  
 She would not cross a road or a rail line in daylight. She would not cross under a wire 
 fence twice in the same place. These were the new protocols. Strictures that had not 
 existed before. Now they did. (25) 
Crossing implies definitions— whether of nations or people or species. To cross in this novel is 
an act of unmaking manmade categories. Like maps, man-made boundaries are arbitrary not 
explanatory. What does it matter to the wolf that she is crossing an international boundary? She 
does not pledge loyalty to any nation, though the human rhetoric repeatedly assigns her to 
Mexico as she brings destruction and violence to American ranchers.  
 But to cross also implies a linearity to events and spaces. Crossing means there is a here 
and a there, a point A and point B. But McCarthy will try to unmake this too. And all of this 
   
     39 
work begins because the wolf crosses. She crosses into Billy’s life, into the United States. She 
crosses out of the multiplicity of animal existence and into isolation. For Deleuze and Guattari, 
every animal is fundamentally a pack (239). This matches Morton’s picture of life as the mesh, 
not individualistic existences. Thus we meet this wolf outside of herself, out of context in two 
important ways. Out of context first because she is alone, and secondly because she is on the 
page.  
 When Billy finally catches the wolf, his world transforms. Heart racing and mind 
spinning, Billy “was in no way prepared for what he beheld” (53). When Billy appears to be 
riding off to get his father he hesitates: “He sat the horse for a long time. The sun warm on his 
back. The world waiting. Then he rode back to the wolf” (53). This mention of “the world 
waiting” is interesting because I don’t think McCarthy means Billy Parham’s world, the 
Southwest, or the wolf’s world, even if these are all one. In McCarthy the world never waits for 
men. I think McCarthy here means the novel’s world, the world we enter too as readers. The 
hinge for us is Billy’s turning back to the wolf. This matters for the story.  
 Billy proceeds to take the wolf, not home to his father, but on to Mexico. He sets out on a 
rash voyage to return the wolf to the place Billy believes she belongs. His efforts to protect her 
and learn from her end in her death. One way to read this death is to see the environmental 
lesson: “McCarthy uses a lone wolf, the pregnant she-wolf, to present his argument that man 
kills that which he cannot control” (Sanborn 148). We might argue that in spite of Billy’s 
seemingly noble intentions to respect the wolf, “Even honorable acts go horribly awry” (Sanborn 
143).  
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 But there’s more to this. Billy’s actions thus far go horribly because he is unable to 
escape imposing a narrative structure on the world. Wolfe addresses a problem in the discipline 
of animal studies, noting that such studies can commit the very error they are trying to avoid:  
 Just because we direct our attention to the study of nonhuman animals, and even if we do 
 so with the aim of exposing how they have been misunderstood and exploited, that does 
 not mean that we are not continuing to be humanist—and therefore, by definition, 
 anthropocentric. (99) 
As Wolfe criticizes this discipline, so Billy is culpable of murdering the wolf despite his good 
intentions. From the moment Billy catches the wolf, he makes the fatal error of failing to 
acknowledge the abyss between himself and the wolf. Derrida strongly disavows the existence of 
“homogenous continuity between what calls itself man and what he calls the animal” (30). To 
assume that animals operate like humans is not compassionate; it is narcissistic. When Billy 
thinks that the wolf longs to return to Mexico, he puts inside her his own desire for a home. The 
concept of home offers Billy both an origin and a destination; thus “home” reaffirms linear 
structure in the world. But Billy mistakenly reads such order into the world of the wolf. Derrida 
goes so far as to call this kind of conflation “a stupid memory lapse…a naïve misapprehension” 
(30). The following are examples of Billy’s naivety in putting the wolf’s existence into his 
human narratives.  
 Initially, the wolf violently resists Billy’s roping and muzzling with every fiber of her 
(physical) being. Frustrated by her resistance, Billy tells her, “You aint got no damn sense” (57). 
If only Billy could understand the meaning of these words, for they mean quite the opposite of 
what he intends. The wolf’s absence of “sense” is not her downfall; rather, Billy’s possession of 
sense causes rupture in The Crossing.  
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 When the wolf is taken from Billy by Mexican authorities, he finds her again in a circus, 
tied up, and prodded with a stick for the entertainment of paying attendees. Billy approaches the 
cart where she is tied. Once there, he speaks to the wolf, wishing upon her the desires of his own 
heart:  
 He said what was in his heart. He made her promises that he swore to keep in the 
 making. That he would take her to the mountains where she would find others of her 
 kind. (105) 
Billy engages the wolf in what he thinks is an exchange. He shares his desires with her and 
pretends to know hers. Again, he assumes that the wolf wants return to her origin, the mountains, 
where he assumes the other wolves await her. He makes promises, agreements with her, which 
she is in reality not a part of.  
 When a man passing him on the road asks Billy just what he plans to do with the wolf he 
is dragging alongside his horse, Billy responds: “Fixin to take it home” (58). “Home?” the old 
man incredulously replies, “Whatever in the contumacious hell for?” (59). Here Billy assumes 
that the wolf, like man, possesses a discrete mappable “home” in which she exists. His 
assumption is childish, for the wolf does not live like the Parhams. Furthermore, the narrative of 
unwanted beings crossing from Mexico into the United States is one that Billy accidentally 
adopts: “She come up from Mexico,” he tells an old man in a pickup truck. “Ever other damn 
thing does,” is the man’s vicious reply. Unfortunately, Billy’s narrative of home and belonging 
hinges on exclusion. The wolf is from Mexico, thus she must be taken back to Mexico. Though 
Billy never engages this nationalistic tension, his actions imply that the wolf cannot become a 
part of his home.  His world is sectioned into human and nonhuman spaces of belonging.  
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 Billy cannot but read the wolf into a tale of his world, a tale that requires a journey to 
return her to Mexico. “He squatted there watching her with the rope in both hands. Like a man 
entrusted with the keeping of something which he hardly knew the use of” (79). This is the 
problem: Billy does not understand the wolf because he continues to see her in his own terms of 
use, home, and existence. Billy’s efforts make no impact: “He talked to her about his life but it 
didnt seem to rest her fears” (89). His linguistic meaning is not something the wolf shares. His 
boundaries, and crossing, do more harm than good for the wolf, in spite of his intentions, because 
they make of her what she fundamentally is not: a tale.  
 In Mexico, Billy must relinquish the wolf to authorities at least as destructive to her as 
Billy’s father would have been. Once her time in the circus proves less than profitable, they bring 
the wolf to an arena where she fights with dogs. This fighting draws a crowd of spectators. When 
Billy finds her here, he cuts silently through the crowd, “and when he reached the wooden 
parapet he stepped over it and walked out into the pit” (116). Here, perhaps for the first time, 
Billy starts to become wolf. He crosses a man-made boundary without regard, much as the wolf 
herself did not recognize boundaries. Taking his stance beside her, Billy responds to the young 
hacendado and he finally begins to explain his actions: “I never thought about this country one 
way or the other” (119). Billy realizes that “the wolf knew nothing of boundaries” (119). Billy 
finally begins to see as the wolf sees, though ironically, and intentionally, his becoming aligns 
with what we perceive to be the loss of the wolf.  
 Readers are tempted, even invited, to emotionally invest in this wolf as Billy does. The 
Mexican men drag and kick the wolf, calling her a coward, and this feels far more disgusting 
than when Billy gently feeds the wolf entrails of a rabbit he has caught for her to eat (133). But is 
their dragging of the wolf into the arena really all that different from Billy dragging her into 
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Mexico? McCarthy shows us the dangers of such emotional investments devoid of the reality of 
the wolf. When we absorb animals into our humanistic understandings, we limit them and render 
them false to their realities.  
 McCarthy recounts Billy’s last moments with the dead wolf before he buries her. Rather 
than talk to her as he has done, Billy does what he could not do while she lived (at least, not with 
her consent): he touches her:  
 [He] put his hand upon her bloodied forehead and closed his own eyes that he could see 
 her running in the mountains, running in the starlight were the grass was wet and the 
 sun’s coming as yet had not undone the rich matrix of creatures passed in the night before 
 her. Deer and hare and dove and groundvole all richly empaneled on the air for her 
 delight, all nations of the possible world ordained by God of which she was one among 
 and not separate from. (127) 
The key to Billy’s becoming wolf is that he must shut his eyes. Here he realizes the impossibility 
of using his vision as hers. The wolf’s world is one of multiplicity, many and different lives 
belonging to the world together in kinship. But it is the wolf’s bloodied and dead skull that 
produces such a vision, forcing us to wonder if McCarthy is telling us that this sort of kinship is 
only possible in death. For when Billy holds the dead wolf, McCarthy tells us “he reached to 
hold what cannot be held, what already ran among the mountains at once terrible and of great 
beauty” (127).  
 An important question follows: if Billy’s efforts to understand the wolf end only in her 
demise, does McCarthy do violence to the wolf in narrativizing her as well? When Billy visits 
Senor Don Arnulfo in his early efforts to help his father trap the wolf, Arnulfo gives Billy an 
important analogy: the wolf is like a snowflake.  
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 You catch the snowflake but when you look in your hand you dont  have it no more. 
 Maybe you see this dechado. But before you can see it it is gone. If you want to see it you 
 have to see it on its own ground. (46) 
Arnulfo understands what Billy must learn. The wolf will not be muzzled and understood by 
men, and under such control she ceases to be what she otherwise is.  I think McCarthy 
understands, unlike Billy, that the wolf he writes is not the she wolf standing there, but his own 
version of her. The wolf of The Crossing is like a crushed and evaporated snowflake beneath 
McCarthy’s pen. But we can read her murder at Billy and McCarthy’s hands, not as loss, but as 
sacrifice. In Bataille’s understanding, “Killing is only the exhibition of a deep meaning” (49). In 
his important concept of sacrifice, Bataille sees how something passes from the violent 
consumption of the humanistic world to the “violence of unconditional consumption” (49). 
McCarthy, like Billy, does violence to the wolf when he brings her into his story. But 
McCarthy’s kind of violence against the wolf acts, much like sacrifice, to reveal to us how to live 
deeply entrenched in the world, at one with violence and apart from the control of language. 
McCarthy’s sacrifice of the wolf allows Billy to enter her immanent world. As he touches her 
dead body, he starts to become wolf.  
 
Becoming Wolf: Violence 
 In what we know of her life and her death, the wolf is both a perpetrator and a victim of 
violence. As such, she demonstrates that the world is a cycle of violence and death.  
 When the flames came up her eyes burned out there like gatelamps to another world. A 
 world burning on the shore of an unknowable void. A world construed out of blood and 
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 blood’s alkahest and blood in its integument because it was that nothing save blood had 
 power to resonate against that void which threatened hourly to devour it. (74) 
The wolf’s perspective is one in which blood, death, and violence are intrinsic to life. An 
“alkahest” was an alchemical term for a universal solvent that could dissolve even gold. This 
image connects to the final passage about the wolf, which references “what cannot be held never 
be held” and has “power to cut and shape and hollow out the dark form of the world” because 
this is what an alkahest would be and do (127). The wolf’s world consists of blood and fire: in a 
word, violence.  
 Barry Lopez explains that what seems to us to be a senseless, excessive kind of violence 
is part of the wolf’s way of life:   
 Wolves do not kill just the old, the weak, and the injured. They also kill animals in the 
 prime of health. And they don’t always kill just what they need; they sometimes kill in 
 excess. And wolves kill each other. The reasons for these acts are not clear. No 
 one…knows why wolves do what they do. (4) 
Lopez, like McCarthy alludes to the disconnect between human understanding and the wolf. 
When we meet McCarthy’s wolf, she is feasting on stillborn calves: 
 Twice she found these pale unborn still warm and gawking on the ground,  milkblue and 
 near translucent in the dawn like beings miscarried from another world entire. She ate 
 even their bones where they lay blind and dying in the snow. (26) 
Here the wolf’s activities, as Lopez suggests, do not align with human sensibilities or appetites. 
But Billy’s relationship with the wolf is never outside of this violence. A mutual respect between 
boy and wolf is achieved but it is not a friendship. Each party senses impending murder from the 
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other: According to Bataille, intimacy is violence. Thus, as Billy becomes wolf, gaining intimacy 
with the world means involving himself in its violence.  
 After the wolf’s death, something about Billy changes. We hear that he “wandered on 
into the mountains. He whittled a bow from a holly limb, made arrows from cane. He thought to 
become again the child he never was” (129). Billy is reborn in the violence of the wolf’s death 
and life. He starts over as the child he never was, with a sense of belonging.  
 Billy now enters into a strange blood covenant with the world, evident in his actions 
immediately following the wolf’s death. After launching an arrow into the breast of a hawk, 
Billy tries to find the hawk’s body. He fails to find the bird but instead sees “a single drop of 
blood that had dried on the rocks” (129). Billy then slices his own hand with a knife and 
“watched the slow blood dropping on the stone” (130). We can read Billy’s giving of blood for 
blood as his participation in the world in a deeper way than only “reading” it. This giving of 
blood reflects what Sanborn explains:  
 The trapper and the wolf are in a blood covenant, the result of which is loss of trapper 
 and loss of wolf and perhaps the ancient rituals of blood between man and  wolf are part 
 of the collective unconscious of each, and of both. (136) 
Billy enters into life by acknowledging that his elemental material, blood, is a part of the world’s 
elemental materials.  
Becoming Wolf: Leaving Language 
  The most important evidence of Billy’s becoming wolf is his growing distrust of 
language. At the novel’s start, Billy is naming things for his younger brother. He seems to have 
an abundance of words: “He carried Boyd before him in the bow of the saddle and named to him 
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features of the landscape and birds and animals in both spanish and english” (3).5 In an echo of 
Eden, we see man as a creature with the power to name and thus exercise dominion over the 
creatures of earth. But Billy’s name-giving powers quickly dissipate.  
 When Billy tries to speak to the wolf “his voice seemed only to make her shudder” (56). 
Later Billy surrenders his rifle in order to take the wolf and bury her. The sheriff asks Billy what 
he traded his rifle for, and Billy answers: 
 I dont think I could say. 
 You mean you wont say. 
 No sir. I mean I ain’t sure I could put a name to it. (170) 
Billy realizes that the wolf is outside the boundary of his language. He gives up control over the 
world outside himself when he acknowledges that he cannot name her. Billy’s earliest glimpse of 
wolves also goes outside of language: “The wolves twisted and turned and leapt in a silence such 
that they seemed of another world entire” (4). Billy responds to their silence with his own: 
“When he got back to the house Boyd was awake but he didnt tell him where he’d been nor what 
he’d seen. He never told anybody” (5). Billy’s silence implies not only the reverence Luce 
ascribes to it, but also a sense of escape from the control of human language (The Vanishing 
World 175). As Bourassa summarizes:  
 The becoming-wolf of Billy Parham is his residence in the world that cannot be 
 touched, his loneliness is no longer human; his humanity, if it is still there, is just one 
 more name in a world that cannot be held down by names. (114) 
 
 
                                                
5 Interesting that McCarthy doesn’t offer languages the reverence of capitalization 
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Post-wolf: The Stories 
“This picture of the world is perilous” (293) 
 
 After the world’s death, Billy, like Cain, seems doomed not to die but to wander the 
earth. In his wanderings, he lives off of the kindness of strangers. As men and women he does 
not know feed and house Billy, they tell him stories. These stories amass into a weight that 
threatens to consume the second half of the novel. But weaving all these stories together we still 
follow the story of Billy, Boyd, and their father’s stolen horses.  
 “Doomed enterprises divide lives forever into the then and the now” (129). These words 
interject the presence of a narrating authority and signal the beginning of the second half of The 
Crossing, the post-wolf part. This is the very trapping of storytelling that The Crossing contains 
without possessing. Billy’s life is only divided if we are in that waiting world of storytelling.   
 Stories within stories always alert the analytical reader to take note, for an author seems 
to be revealing something about his craft in such a moment. But could an author use his 
characters’ storytelling as a kind of smoke screen? These tales may be, to use Macbeth’s words, 
“full of sound and fury/signifying nothing.” Furthermore, like Billy’s efforts to put the wolf into 
the human story, the tales go so far as to obstruct what is real. What if, rather than making sense 
of our world as they so often claim to do, stories dangerously increase our distance from the 
world?   
 In his book Deleuze and American Literature, Alan Bourassa explains McCarthy’s 
unique perspective on what it is to be human and what novels have to do with this. Bourassa 
writes of how human beings understand ourselves through stories: “the meaning of the human 
must be given in the form of a narrative, of happenings that are bound together with the human—
the humanity of the human—as its telos” (76). Fiction generally lends itself to interpreting the 
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human in this way. The characters of the story live, die, murder, eat, or marry and these moments 
contribute to our definition of human. But what about fiction that does not want to offer meaning 
to the human life? Bourassa asks:  
 But surely there are fictions that have no truck with meaning, that short circuit all  the 
 mechanisms of meaning, that fragment time, flatten character, affirm no value, play 
 intellectual games, refuse direction, unmask the myth of reference for endlessness of 
 signification. (77)   
Such fictions respond to meaninglessness in the world with an emptying of meaning in words. 
Bourassa offers an honest challenge to these fictions by admitting that readers miss the authority 
of the old kind of narratives: 
 Are we forbidden to ask for narratives that speak of the human, that are ethical, 
 passionate, and authoritative but that also, in keeping narrative, strip it bare? Can we 
 seek stories where the materiality of language does not leave narrative behind but 
 occupies it like a sort of benevolent parasite? (77) 
Bourassa admits that this would be “strange writing,” that would “have direction, but direction to 
no end” (77). 
 I include lengthy quotes because Bourassa’s analysis offers such a perceptive explanation 
of what is going on in McCarthy generally, but especially in The Crossing and its stories. 
Bourassa posits that McCarthy’s narratives “employ something like narrative while taking away 
narrative’s own world” (78). I think this is the paradox at the heart of The Crossing: McCarthy’s 
tale is unworking the meaning that the embedded tales, and even his large tale, attempt to make.  
 These stunning tales that fill the latter half of the novel call out to us like sirens to 
interpret the world through stories, but they take us nowhere. Or to clarify: they take us nowhere 
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of linear significance. Here lies a spatial paradox to match the artistic one. As I mentioned at the 
beginning of the chapter, crossings imply a linear structure of things (journeys on maps, starting 
points and destinations, roads). Likewise, stories imply beginnings and ends, with events that 
have additive meaning in a narrative progression. But The Crossing uses the linear to overthrow 
this sense of progress.  
 Georges Bataille explains how human beings create tools in order to maintain their 
distance from intimate, animal existence in the world: “The developed tool is the nascent form of 
the non-I…The tool brings exteriority into the world” (27). Though Bataille does not suggest 
this, I wonder whether or not a story can act as a tool does. Perhaps stories can break our 
continuity with the world by bringing existence out of immanence and into human 
consciousness.  
 In McCarthy’s embedded stories in The Crossing, we see a meta-meditation on the power 
and peril of human storytelling. The three tales I examine here are those of the ex-priest, the 
eyeless veteran of the revolution, and the gypsy hired to return an airplane. The stories make us 
ask: can human storytelling actually impede intimate existence in the world? The stories come to 
terms with this danger, but in some moments, they deny it by continuing to build these pictures 
of the world. The latter denial serves only to increase our human blindness.  
1st Tale 
 As Billy makes his way back towards the United States after the wolf dies, he rides up to 
a collapsed adobe church. In the doorway of the church, a figure beckons him to come inside. 
This man fixes Billy some eggs, sits him down with his clutter of cats, and tells him a story. The 
man builds his story out of his past wanderings, which he likens to Billy’s wandering. “I thought 
that men had not inquired sufficiently into miracles of destruction,” he begins (142). He tells of a 
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man who lost his parents in fights between Mexican locals and American invaders. “This is a 
story of misfortune,” he tells Billy, “Or so it would seem. The end is not yet told” (144). The 
man goes on to lose his only son in similar political violence. After abandoning his wife, he 
wanders to the capital where he becomes a messenger: “He carried a satchel of leather and 
canvas secured with a lock. He had no way to know what the messages said nor had he any 
curiosity concerning them” (147). In such a job, this man begins to lose his humanistic moorings 
in his world. Rather than investing words with a sense of purpose himself, he becomes nothing 
more than a carrier of words, without meaning to him. Instead he realizes that the human 
narratives, “those aims and purposes with which they imagine their movements to be invested 
are in reality but a means by which to describe them” (148).  
 This man imagines God as a destructive force as well as a creative one. He pictures God 
bent in the work of “weaving the world…the world in its making and its unmaking” (149). The 
man takes up residence beneath a perilously hanging dome of an old church, a space the villagers 
nearby are too scared to enter into because the structure may collapse at any moment. Here a 
priest comes to the man, intrigued by his location, and attempts to preach to him. The man tells 
the priest the story of his life, his conclusions, but refuses the absolution that the priest would 
offer him. When the priest attempts to give the dying man last rites, the old man “seized his arm 
midway in its crossing there in the still air by his deathbedside and stayed him with his eyes… 
‘Save yourself, he hissed’” (157). This priest, as it turns out, is the narrator of this story.  
 The priest tried to offer a structure to the world with his religion. His attempt to “cross” 
the man reminds us of the crossings this novel recounts. Such crossings, as noted towards the 
beginning, try to render the world travelable, knowable, and containable. But the priest learns 
that this is not so; he gives up his profession as a “man of words:”   
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 He’d no answers to the questions the old messenger had brought from the capital.  The 
 more he considered them the more knotted they became. The more he attempted even to 
 formulate them the more they eluded his representation and finally he came to see that 
 they were not the old pensioner’s queries at all but his own. (157)  
“Every word we speak is vanity,” he tells Billy (158). Yet, the vanity of words is further 
evidenced, as the priest does not heed his own words. Instead, he takes up the dead man’s failed 
career of messenger, and tries to teach Billy a world of words and tale: “This world also which 
seems to us a thing of stone and flower and blood is not a thing but a tale” (143). With his toothy 
one-eared “cat of counsel” in his lap, he submits: “All is the telling. Do not doubt it” (155).  
 This man recognizes the dangerous trap of believing that his world is one of story even as 
he falls into this trap. The man’s concise summation, “All is the telling. Do not doubt it,” implies 
that we can arrive at conclusions like this (155). Our ex-priest abuts against the limits of a 
religious narrative of God and of the world but he remains unable to get outside of such limits.  
2nd Tale 
 After a fight with the men who have the Parhams’ stolen horses, Boyd is badly wounded 
and Billy must send him on with strangers to get help while Billy escapes in the other direction. 
Billy finds shelter at the home of a woman and her blind husband. Blind is an understatement. 
This man tells Billy how during the revolution a German mercenary sucked out his eyes and left 
him with holes in his head. The blind man is an interesting case study in the human. What does a 
loss of physical vision help us learn about what life means? The blind man believes that “men 
with eyes may select what they wish to see but for the blind the world appears of its own will” 
(291). He thinks his blindness takes away his control over the world. His blindness is like a 
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posthuman awareness, if we imagine sight as a metaphor for humanistic pictures of the world. In 
losing his eyes, he loses the world as his eyes capture it:  
 He said that in his first years of darkness his dreams had been vivid beyond all 
 expectation and that he had come to thirst for them but that dreams and memories  alike 
 had faded… .Of all that once had been no trace remained. The look of the world. The 
 faces of loved ones. Finally even his own person was lost to him. Whatever he had been 
 he was  no more. (291)  
Because this man cannot see, he “is not” in a sense. He is no longer a human being if to be 
human implies to control the world with narrating vision: “He said that in his blindness he had 
indeed lost himself” (291). McCarthy continuously shows us how men dream that they control 
things with their language when they do not. Thus, the man’s blindness gives him the gift of 
increased intimacy with the world from which our internal vision hinders us. This must be why 
he acknowledges that his blindness is a kind of blessing (294). Things we claim to see become 
“no more than obstacles to be negotiated in the ultimate sightlessness of the world” (294).  
 This blind man offers us an idea of what it would look like to totally give up our human 
vision of the world and submit to darkness. “The picture of the world is all the world men know 
and this picture of the world is perilous,” he tells Billy (293). To put it another way, we only 
know our story of the world and that story is dangerously deceptive to us as we are the authors of 
it. With this narcissistic vision of the world, a man will fruitlessly “call upon the world to testify 
as to the truth of what are in fact but his desires” (293).  
 The blind man tells Billy that man “may seek to indemnify his words with blood for by 
now he will have discovered that words pale and lose their savor while pain is always new” 
(293). Here he reminds Billy that words are something less real than pain, implying that life is 
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outside of words. In the pain of his blindness, not his stories, this man shows us how the linear 
narrative of the world is inadequate.   
3rd Tale 
 On his way to bury his brother, four horsemen accost Billy and stab his horse in the chest. 
Shortly thereafter, he meets a band of gypsies who help care for his injured horse. While they 
camp together, one gypsy offers to tell Billy the true history of the airplane they are carrying 
with them. Billy smiles wryly at such an offer, for the phrase “true history” is an oxymoron 
(404). The gypsy submits his idea of a “third history” to acknowledge such paradox:  
 It is the history that each man makes alone out of what is left to him. Bits of wreckage. 
 Some bones. The words of the dead. How make a world of this? How live in that world 
 once made? (411) 
The gypsy meditates on this idea of a third history, one of our own building, in the content of the 
“history” he tells. He recounts for Billy how two young American pilots crashed two similar 
airplanes in the mountains of Mexico. One pilot’s father hired this gypsy to bring his son’s 
wrecked plane to him. Billy tries to understand whether it would make any difference to the 
father of this pilot if the plane was actually the one his son crashed or the other. But the gypsy 
reminds him: “The identity of the airplane would be brought into question which in the 
mountains was no question at all” (406). Our human story tries to pull meaning from objects in 
which the world recognizes no meaning. Our questions of individual identity become irrelevant 
in the wider reality of the world.  
 This gypsy tells a great story about a journey to identify a plane, but McCarthy draws 
extra attention to the crafting of his tale. Phrases remind us throughout that this is his story: “He 
populated the terrain for them with certain birds and animals” (407) “He shaped his mouth and 
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said…” (410). His story, much like their efforts to reclaim the plane, must be subjected to the 
natural force of the world. This is evident in his description of their surroundings when they 
reclaimed the plane:  
 …the way the river went howling through the narrows like a train and at night the  rain 
 which had fallen for miles into that ultimate sundering of the earth’s rind hisses in their 
 driftwood fires and the solid rock about them through which the water roared would 
 shudder like a woman and if they spoke to one another no words formed in the air for 
 the awful noise in that nether world. (407) 
Here the water takes on a crafting power greater than the gypsy’s, because his words cannot even 
come into being against the roar of the river. Likewise, they cannot bring the plane out against 
the river: “All of their enterprise had vanished in the flood as if it had never been at all. The river 
continued to rise” (408).  
 When Billy tells the gypsy that he is returning to his country, the gypsy smiles 
knowingly, much as Billy did at the gypsy’s oxymoronic offer to tell a true history. His smile 
tells us that returning is impossible. The gypsy eventually responds that, contrary to what 
humanity so often thinks, the way of the world is not fixed in any place (413-414). Here he 
points us to existence that would likewise be unfixed, in keeping with the world’s reality. The 
gypsies embody this in their nomadic life. Billy sees them as “world wanderers…at once vigilant 
and unconstrained. They stood in no proprietary relationship to anything, scarcely even to the 
space they occupied” (409-410). Here McCarthy taps into something that is essential to intimate 
existence in the world, apart from humanistic structures. This nomadic lifestyle, also 
progressively adopted by Billy in his becoming through the course of the novel, keeps these 
people from living in the humanistic pretense of ownership and dominance in the world.    
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 To portray this kind of existence for Billy, the gypsy recalls objects from his childhood. 
This gypsy’s father collected old photographs of strangers and hung them up above his cart, for 
his son to see. To his son, these pictures later taught him how 
 every representation was an idol. Every likeness a heresy. In their images they had 
 thought to find some small immortality but oblivion cannot be appeased. (413) 
Like these “yellowing daguerreotypes,” the gypsy’s story hangs strangely suspended between the 
events of McCarthy’s story. And like the gypsy boy staring at his father’s collection, we could 
try to take from human stories “some secret thing” (412). But to do so would be to commit an 
idolatry that disregards the transient reality of the world.  
 Each of these embedded tales is a story of reckoning with loss, violence, and destruction. 
Readers will inevitably want to read them as allegories of McCarthy’s own tales, because in a 
sense they are. But in reading meaning into the tales, we must recognize the danger of such an 
act. These storytellers, each in his own way, recognize such danger even as they tell their tales. 
Thus, McCarthy communicates to us that his own allegorizing is not an end in itself. Human 
narratives can act as siren songs to the world itself rather than being the worlds they pretend to 
be. In other words, narratives dangerously lure us to interpret reality when reality exceeds 
interpretations. As these storytellers, and McCarthy, acknowledge between their lines, worlds do 
not wait on human stories to advance. To think they do is to radically misunderstand our 
positions in the world.   
 The violence that the stories try to make sense of is ultimately the reminder that we are 
more than stories. And even more importantly, the stories themselves commit violence to the 
world when they make the tangible intangible. The blind man warns Billy: “That which was 
given him to help him make his way in the world has power also to blind him to the way where 
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his true path lies” (293). He rightly acknowledges that this narrative of life will blind Billy more 
than it will direct him. But the blind man does not go quite far enough, still implying that Billy 
has a true path. The gypsy knows better when he tells Billy that the world is not fixed. By the 
novel’s end, Billy realizes that the real lie is that he has a “true path” at all in this world. So, 
instead of continuing to make his way through the world, Billy sits down in the middle of a road 
and weeps. This story, his story, can carry him no further, but the world’s larger life carries on. 
The novel’s final line reminds us of this: “The right and godmade sun did rise, once again, for all 
and without distinction” (426). To me, this final line reads mockingly, as though McCarthy is 
parodying how the novel should end. Terms like “right” and “godmade” resound emptily at the 
end of The Crossing. McCarthy’s description of the sun’s rising places it in hopelessly limited 
human terms because the sun only “rises” in our perspective. But the sun’s radiant presence is a 
picture of the life that lies outside Billy’s story, McCarthy’s story, or the humanist story in 
general.  
 This is indeed strange writing, directionless direction, as Bourassa suggests. McCarthy 
provocatively leads us into a kind of trap, luring us into what appears to be a winning story of 
boy and wolf and then unraveling them both through the narrative and narratives that follow. Of 
Billy we might rightly conclude:  “His actions have not added up to a story. Instead his story has 
been stripped from him episode by episode” (Bourassa 84). Stories surround Billy like the icons 
and gifts surround Boyd on his pallet (299). But McCarthy tells us that Billy knew “that there 
was no certainty to any of it” (346). “What the hell good are papers without the horse?” Billy 
learns the hard way that sometimes ink and paper cannot contain the world he inhabits (248).  
Billy’s mistakes run deeper than his decision to take the wolf to Mexico. His true error lies in 
assuming that such an action will add up to a story. 
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 When Billy sits down in the road at the novel’s end, he finally stops trying to build his 
actions into a moving story. No longer trying to cross or return, Billy subsides into still, silent 
weeping, letting his own body’s water flow into the world. Such an activity demonstrates his 
harmony with his surroundings, “water in water” (Bataille 19). His story is stripped from him, so 
now he can be posthuman.   
 
FINAL THOUGHTS: FIRE 
 Billy first discovers the elusive wolf by investigating the remains of a campfire. We read 
that he “sat his horse looking down at the dead black fire. Something had been digging in the 
ashes” (49). Billy Parham’s becoming posthuman began in those ashes. His encounter with the 
wolf undoes him and his story of the world. But fire is not just an external clue leading Billy to 
the wolf. The wolf is, in a sense, on fire, for fire is present inside the wolves Billy saw as a child: 
“Their breath smoked palely in the cold as if they burned with some inner fire” (3). Fire, much 
like the wolf, is a paradox. Fire is essential, life giving, and yet fire is indicative of the 
destruction of life: “at once terrible and of great beauty” (127).  
 Fire reveals to Billy not only the wolf but also the larger reality with which she is 
continuous. Fiery destruction seems to be the only way for Billy to understand the world:  
 In that wild country he’d lie in the cold and the dark and listen to the wind and watch the 
 last few embers of his fire at their dying and red crazings in the woodcoals where they 
 broke along their unguessed gridlines. As if in the trying of the wood were elicited hidden 
 geometries and their orders which could only stand fully revealed, such is the way of the 
 world, in darkness and ashes. (130) 
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Again McCarthy’s fire is a paradox: only in the dark ashes of destruction is this hidden geometry 
of the world revealed. Perhaps we can apply the same paradox to Billy. Only after fire’s work on 
him, only after the wolf’s destruction, can he live in intimacy with the world, like water in water.   
 Fire’s destruction parallels the work of McCarthy’s novels. Both are paradoxical, creative 
and destructive. Fire’s destruction is transformative, a becoming in some sense. McCarthy’s 
novels too are alive with this transformation. The sun that rises in the novel’s end is the ultimate 
consummation of this paradox. The sun exists as fire that burns but does not consume. Its 
glowing self-sufficiency and radiance embody Bataille’s concept of immanence. The sun’s 
ontology is ultimately outside of language or narrative. And the sun is what McCarthy’s novel 
points us towards. Outside the story lies reality.    
 After the epilogue to the border trilogy’s final novel, Cities of the Plain, McCarthy’s 
includes these lines called “Dedication:” 
 I will be your child to hold 
 And you be me when I am old  
 The world grows cold  
 The heathen rage 
 The story’s told 
 Turn the page. (294)  
McCarthy ends emphatically: “The story’s told.” The human narrative, the empowerment of 
language in story form, is finished. What is left after such is to “turn the page,” to move outside 
of narrative and hopefully closer to intimate existence in this world, closer to the wolf. 
Crouching low like Lester in the caves, sitting down like Billy in front of the sun, we sink closer 
into intimate belonging.   
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 But another fire looms towards the end of The Crossing, a fire that parodies the sun’s 
paradoxical radiance. From afar, Billy witnesses the Trinity nuclear testing at Alamogordo in 
1945 in what he sees as “The white light of the desert noon” (425). This reference to historical 
events offers the novel’s largest framing story, that of the twentieth century. In Sanders’ house, 
Billy sees the ashtray from the world’s fair: “It was cast from potmetal and it said 1833-1933. It 
said A Century of Progress” (345). But “progress” is an empty word, a souvenir slogan and not a 
reality. For humanism’s “progress” culminates in the man-made fire of the atomic bomb.  
 In his press release following the drop of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, President 
Truman described the nature of bomb’s power: “The force from which the sun draws its power 
has been loosed” (quoted in Kelly 339). Truman’s words echo this connection between the sun 
and the bomb. But for McCarthy, this atomic bomb is a parody of the radiant sun. The bomb is 
the sum total of the human project of meaning-making. All our consciousness, our rationality, 
scientific discovery, and imagining produces this. Secretary of war Henry Stimson called the 
bomb “The culmination of years of herculean effort…the greatest achievement of the combined 
efforts of science, industry, labor, and the military in all history” (quoted in Kelly 343). The 
bomb is not only the culmination of human efforts, but also of the definition of the human begun 
by Descartes, a thinking entity seeking to subdue the world through scientific reasoning. The 
dominating narrators of the American story would place the bomb as the climax of such efforts. 
 But the bomb’s fire parodies the sun’s; it is an attempt to control and consume nature, in 
direct contrast to the transformative and continuous fire of life that that comes from the sun. 
After the war’s end, J. Robert Oppenheimer gave a speech before the scientists he had worked 
with to develop the bomb. In this speech, Oppenheimer reflected on the use of the bomb: 
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 If you are a scientist you believe that it is good to find out how the world works; that is it 
 good to find out what the realities are; that it is good to turn over to mankind at large the 
 greatest possible power to control the world and to deal with it according to its light and 
 its values. (quoted in Kelly 368)  
Here Oppenheimer appears to be about the same business as McCarthy: heightened reality 
through destruction. Oppenheimer explains that humanistic science, via the bomb, tried to 
understand how the world works, and then harness such workings for mankind. But isn’t 
Oppenheimer doing exactly what Billy Parham does with the wolf, when he thinks that he can 
control and contain the world through his discoveries? Oppenheimer enlists nuclear science in 
the narrative of human domination. But nuclear destruction clearly goes outside of our control, 
and nothing, no one, is left in the wake of the bomb. The posthuman fire’s ashes would offer 
radical continuity within destruction, rather than the nuclear ground zero of Hiroshima.  
 Humanism’s story entails apocalypse, as the atomic bomb proves. Because stories have 
endings, existence in narrative will find a way to conclude. Ironically, posthumanism does not 
require such apocalypse. Bataille’s immanence, outside of time, is an existence of constancy, 
without beginning or end.  
 In The Crossing, McCarthy directs us towards becoming beings who do not seek to 
contain the world in our stories, but rather “turn the page” and enter an existence with the wolf, 
possessing that “inner fire” of intimate belonging to this world that we glimpse in the wolf and in 
the sun. Such becoming, such page turning, gains urgency in the light of Oppenheimer’s fire. 
Unless we become something other, this is how the human narrative ends: not with a whimper 
after all, but with a bang 
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III. THE ROAD 
“SOME UNIMAGINABLE FUTURE” 
 At the end of The Crossing, Billy Parham witnesses the testing of the atomic bomb in a 
flashing of false sunlight over the desert. McCarthy alludes to the destructive capacity of 
mankind here. In his 2006 novel The Road, McCarthy will expand on this total destruction. In 
many regards, The Road could “constitute a new phase of McCarthy’s authorship” (Graulund 
58). In the previous novels, his characters’ voyages occur in recognizable terrain. From East 
Tennessee to Mexico, the earlier novels showed us instances of violence which paralleled the 
natural world they existed within; they were isolated, not total. But in The Road, we face the 
potential collapse of humanity and the living world itself in an unrecognizable time and place. 
Granted, readers can identify in The Road an American landscape. The “See Rock City” still 
emblazed on a barn roof offers us concrete proof that this place was the United States. However, 
when the son asks his father along their road, “But there’s not any more states?” his father 
replies, “No” (43). We find ourselves reading a novel of post-American literature.  
 McCarthy’s characters in The Road are an unnamed father and son, whose journey carves 
out the space of this novel within the dark wood we enter on the first page. McCarthy writes this 
whole novel without naming them. To name them would be to suggest a solidity that they do not 
possess. Names place us in a human lineage. But their identities are opened, without history or 
occupation to fence them in. Several of their exchanges with other survivors highlight this. When 
the boy asks, “Who is it,” the reply is: “I dont know. Who is anybody?” (49). When the man 
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holds an approaching stranger at gunpoint, he asks the man, “Are you a doctor?” to which he 
responds, “I’m not anything” (64). An old man they meet asks, “What are you?” (162). That is 
the million-dollar question of this book, but “They’d no way to answer the question” (162).  
 The exact cause of the proliferation of ash is not clear. Potentially nuclear disaster, 
potentially natural disaster. That the cause is unclear is important: we are not allowed to place 
blame but rather we must move forward with the man and boy. Furthermore, the results of the 
disaster are strikingly unrealistic: what disaster could conceivably destroy animals and trees, 
without destroying humanity too? There are no fish in the lake but there is still water. But we 
should not read the lack of realistic destruction from an author seemingly entrenched in scientific 
study and meticulously realistic description as a lapse in research. Instead, McCarthy seems to 
confidently wield a destruction of his own choosing to tell the story he wants to tell. That story 
singles out human beings. But such a singling out does not venerate the human. Rather, 
McCarthy’s isolation of the human species forces the question: who is a man apart from that 
other category “animal?”  
 Removing the animal from the world, from Derrida’s perspective, might further 
McCarthy’s posthuman thought experiment. For without the animal, man loses that linguistic 
dominion which the Biblical narrative gives him in the world. Derrida analyzes the creation 
narrative, in which human beings receive power over the animal as man gets to name the animal. 
Naming for Derrida implies a limit: “Naming involves announcing a death…. Whoever receives 
a name feels mortal or dying, precisely because the name seeks to save him” (20). Derrida aptly 
explores how the practice of naming is an attempt to unduly control and limit the world. Derrida 
questions the reality of nominative dominion as he subtly reminds us that naming came after 
existence: “Who was born first, before the names? Which one saw the other come to this place, 
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so long ago?” (18). McCarthy’s universe in The Road lacks animals, not necessarily because the 
human world has destroyed them, but in order to undress human identity apart from naming, 
relating to a living other. When the man tries to explain a distance to his son, he uses the 
expression “as the crow flies,” the meaning of which is clearly lost on the son (156). “There’s 
not any crows. Are there?” his son asks. “No. Just in books” (158). This exchange illustrates how 
the loss of animals empties human speech of its power in reality. Without “animals” 
differentiated as such, we are in the realm of the posthuman.  
 When commenting on a passage from Outer Dark, Bell notes how in McCarthy’s world, 
“Roads are helpful to us only as long as we believe they are taking us somewhere but…in the 
long run they don’t” (1). Though written long before the publication of The Road, his comment 
seems a fitting place to start. In a novel with such a title, the longtime reader of McCarthy will 
appropriately wonder: will this novel be about the futility of this road too? Roads function here 
much like maps and stories in The Crossing. They represent a way to interpret our existences and 
movements. They organize us, offer us meaning. Roads have survived whatever apocalyptic 
disaster preempted this story, but their further duration is questionable. “But the roads are still 
there,” the son observes to his father (43). “Yes. For a while,” the father adds (43). “There’s 
nothing to uproot them so they should be okay for a while” (43). But as we examine this novel, 
the father’s prediction about the future of roads is increasingly tinged with irony. The Road 
becomes a story of uprooting what roads mean. Roads, as Bell noted years ago, require our belief 
in their meaningful direction to function. Roads are physically present here but we see quickly 
that they are purposeless. Roads symbolize old humanistic meaning. The man carries his driver’s 
license, a personal identification intrinsically tied to the concept of the road, in his pocket long 
after it is obsolete, until we watch him wordlessly abandon the contents of his billfold.  Likewise, 
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McCarthy carrries his story on roads but all the while he is plowing up the concrete. Roads are to 
this world what the license is for the man, because instead of traveling somewhere, man and boy 
are “Treading the dead world under like rats on a wheel” (273). In other words, the man and the 
boy move through the world without origin, road, or destination.  
 Through the characters of the man and the boy, The Road offers a dialogue between the 
fading humanistic world and a budding posthuman world. The boy is a thought experiment in 
what a posthuman could look like. So how does McCarthy update and illuminate our description 
of life through the character of the boy in The Road? His setting certainly offers us a place to 
build new descriptions from ground zero. The old building blocks of meaning have turned to ash. 
Who the people of this new world are and how they live, the meaning they make of it, must be 
new. Or perhaps even further than this, people will stop making meaning of life. McCarthy 
begins to imagine a new kind of existence. To understand this new kind of existence, two 
familiar voices will harmonize with McCarthy’s here: Georges Bataille and Timothy Morton.  
 Morton’s ecological thinking is present throughout my thesis, but here it may be helpful 
to refresh your memory concerning some of his ideas. In his attempt to catch us up with the 
implications of evolutionary science, Morton offers the model of “the mesh” as a concept for 
understanding life. Seeing life as a mesh entails both that each life form is unique and that there 
is no “fixed identity anywhere in the system of life-forms” (“The Mesh” 22). Thus Morton sees 
life in an essentially paradoxical way. In Morton’s view of our current state of environmental 
peril, he calls for an aesthetic of dark ecology. Such an aesthetic would utilize “negativity and 
irony, ugliness and horror” (The Ecological Thought 17). This is because Morton sees that 
ugliness and horror “compel our compassionate coexistence to go beyond condescending pity” 
(17). Certainly readers of The Road can already hear a resonance with McCarthy’s narration in 
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that novel, where he uses atrocity to peel back points of view and call for a new sort of 
compassionate existence.  
 Georges Bataille unravels what he sees as the rupture of man in the world. In contrast to 
animals, humans seek separation from the world through the use of objects, positing themselves 
as separate instead of immanent. For Bataille, this is a major ontological problem. Instead, 
Bataille chronicles an unconscious intimacy with the world that animals experience as superior 
in a sense to the lives of human beings. “If man surrendered unreservedly to immanence, he 
would fall short of humanity…and eventually life would return to the unconscious intimacy of 
animals” (53). Such a surrender and return resonates with Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of 
becoming animal, also referenced in previous chapters. Violence and death play important roles 
for Bataille in this return to intimacy. Through his accounts of war and sacrifice, he shows how 
intimacy is achieved only through violence; violence is necessary for intimacy (80).  
 In The Road, I want to investigate the character of the man as symbolic of the project of 
an old, humanistic order of life, not unlike our own. The man initially endeavors to recreate this 
order for his son in a project of storytelling, linguistic education. But by the end of the novel, the 
father recognizes that such an attempt is not only futile but also detrimental to his son. I want to 
examine the character of the son in order to see what posthuman identity might look like. I want 
to argue that the boy comes much closer to achieving the intimacy with the world that Lester 
Ballard and Billy Parham seek but do not totally attain.  
 This reading of The Road diverges from much of the criticism concerning this novel. In 
the 2008 special issue of the Cormac McCarthy Journal, about half of the articles on The Road 
have titles with words like “ethics,” “compassion,” “divinity,” and “hospitality.” Such readings 
reveal that critics can successfully place The Road in a traditional conversation about the novel 
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and humanity. The fact that Oprah Winfrey selected The Road for her book club further 
illustrates the accessibility of this novel.6 More than any previous McCarthy novel, The Road 
emotionally involves us in the lives of its characters, and calls us to empathize with their story. 
This is a book that blatantly offers a rhetoric of reassuring humanistic meaning. But in spite of 
this, The Road would have us question such rhetoric. My reading is against the grain of this 
novel in many respects, but my entire argument is that McCarthy intends a reading of his novels 
against their own grain. Because reading itself is, after all, a limiting act.  
The Father  
 The father tries to tell the story of the world he knew to his son. For about the first half of 
the book, we watch the father attempt to “rehumanize” his son with his old stories: “they sat 
warm in their refuge while he told the boy stories. Old stories of courage and justice as he 
remembered them until the boy was asleep” (41). The stories, like the warmth of their refuge, 
provide momentary escape from the darkness of the outer reality. The father’s work of 
storytelling is not only for the boy but also for himself. When a forest fire moves the man, we 
hear him think: “Make a list. Recite a litany. Remember” (31). “Evoke the forms. When you’ve 
nothing else construct ceremonies out of the air and breathe upon them” (74). The ceremonies of 
old meaning are not present in this world. But the man builds them out of thin air because he 
does not know how else to exist.  
 The father’s storytelling works alongside his narrative of their lives as journeys, 
according to a map and towards a destination. “We have to keep moving,” the father tells his son 
(42). Such movement implies that they are creatures with a purpose. Using an old oil company 
map, the man and the boy navigate south towards the ocean, where “he hoped it would be 
                                                
6 I don’t mean to imply that accessibility is a negative thing. Rather, I want to show how this novel can be accessed 
as a traditional story, and it can and should also be read as an anti-traditional story.  
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brighter” (213). As the opening paragraph of Melville’s Moby Dick confirms, a narrative directed 
towards the sea is one of hope, life, and escape. The man continues to check their location, 
“studying the twisted matrix of routes in red and black with his finger at the junction where he 
thought that they might be. As if he’d see their small selves crouching there” (86). The man 
hopes to locate them in the world by another paper form of meaning: this map. But he sees how 
futile following the map is: “In what direction did lost men veer?” (116) The father begins to 
realize that he is directionless, not in spite of, but because of this map. His journey is not really a 
journey at all, as the map would have him believe. The ocean, their intended destination, proves 
to be “One vast salt sepulcher. Senseless. Senseless” (222). The ocean does not offer them the 
physical or metaphysical life that the man imagined it would.  
 But the father’s narrativizing project is not limited to the pages of his son’s book or even 
to the map he tries to use. His most dangerous narrative work is the story he tries to build out of 
his own son. From the opening of the novel, we hear the father thinking of his son as the 
centerpiece of a divine story: “He knew only that the child was his warrant. He said: If he is not 
the word of God God never spoke” (5). For the father, his son is the Word. In building a story 
out of this word, the father fulfills the vicious prophecy that his wife made to him before she 
committed suicide (more on her later): 
 The one thing I can tell you is that you won’t survive for yourself. I know because I 
 would never have come this far. A person would be well advised to cobble together some 
 passable ghost. Breathe it into being and coax it along with words of love. Offer it each 
 phantom crumb and shield it from harm with your body. (57)  
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Much as Billy Parham did to the wolf, the father hurts his son as he tries to make of him a story. 
In his efforts to protect his son and instill in him a humanistic, linguistic-based worldview, the 
father is actually making of his son a “passable ghost,” pushing him farther from the being he is.  
 The man mourns the loss of “beauty” and “goodness” which are “things that he’d no 
longer any way to think about at all” (129-130). He sums up what he has lost in a memory of a 
day spent on the lake near his uncle’s farm. Crossing the lake in a rowboat with his uncle at 
dusk: “This was the perfect day of his childhood. This was the day to shape the days upon” (13). 
This cherished lake has experienced natural destruction: “a riprap of twisted stumps, gray and 
weathered, the windfall of trees of a hurricane years past” (13). This place has also been the 
object of human violence: “The trees themselves had long been sawed for firewood and carried 
away” (13). The memory that the father idolizes, that serves as a mold for his future 
disappointment in the world, is exactly that: a memory.  
 The man mourns the world of his dreams but this is not an actual world. Morton 
addresses the literature of nature elegies as being “a paradox…about losing something we never 
really had” (105). Perhaps the man’s elegiac work of storytelling to his son fails because he is 
trying to give reality to unreality; he is about a contradictory work. That perfect day was not a 
perfect day, nor was that world a perfect world. The difference may in part reside in the time: the 
man’s memory holds this lake so that the man can possess it, remember it and place it into his 
narrative as he wants, while the world of the present does not offer him such control. 
Additionally, that day on the lake was his “perfect day” as the man recalls that neither he nor his 
uncle “had spoken a word” (13). Perhaps the perfection the man craves has less to do with the 
world and more to do with his relationship to it. And maybe, without even realizing it himself, 
the man shows us that such perfection comes outside of language.  
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 The man distrusts his dreams of “siren worlds” but he cannot escape them (18). He 
continues to have “rich dreams which he was now loathe to wake from” (131). The function of 
the man’s dreams is difficult to decipher. In some respect, the dreams represent how the human 
imagination can provide a means of escape. If our understanding of man is that his consciousness 
is the centerpiece of his being, then that capability offers escape from even the dire 
circumstances of The Road. But in The Road, respite through dreams proves crippling, reminding 
us that this definition of man as conscious being must be inadequate. The man can escape in 
dreams but he must awake to dark reality. The dreams then serve as more of a taunt than a 
comfort. Though he goes back on this statement later, the man tells his son: “When your dreams 
are of some world that never was or of some world that never will be and you are happy again 
then you will have given up…And you can’t give up” (189). The man admits that his dreams are 
not worth having.  
 The father’s attempts to recreate his familiar Western humanity for his son fail because 
they inadequately attempt to contain or escape from the world in which he lives. Ultimately the 
man must submit to this ashen reality: “There is no other tale to tell,” he thinks (32). Watching 
his son, he aches that the story of life will end in darkness: “Please don’t tell me how the story 
ends” (75). Still the father must position himself upon a narrative line, now placing himself “at 
the end” of something. The fullest expression of the inadequacy of the man’s humanistic project 
occurs in the bunker, after the man dreams of alien-like creatures approaching him:  
 Maybe he understood for the first time that to the boy he was himself an alien. A being 
 from a planet that no longer existed. The tales of which were suspect. He could not 
 construct for the child’s pleasure the world he’d lost without constructing the loss as well 
 and he thought perhaps the child had known this better than he. (153-154)  
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The man realizes that his stories do not matter now. Like the aliens of his dream, he is himself an 
alien in the world where the boy is a native inhabitant. Finally the man is trying to be posthuman 
when he realizes that his son is “himself an alien” to his father. In his attempts to story the child, 
he made the mistake of teaching his son that he lived in loss. Without the stories, the boy does 
not expect a world different than the one he experiences. In giving the child stories, the father 
falsely promised his son placement in a story too, even if only at “the end” of the human story. 
But the father must admit, “that he could not enkindle in the heart of the child what was the ashes 
in his own” (154). He eventually forsakes such an effort because he realizes that, in imposing the 
past upon his child, he only condemns him to unfilled desire turned despair. The novel’s end 
congruously brings the father’s end too, for he cannot exist in a world where tales are suspect. 
Because the story ends, because stories all end, the father must also end.  
The Son  
 Shortly before the father dies, he observes his son in front of him on the road of time, 
both physically and metaphorically: “Looking back at him from some unimaginable future, 
glowing in the waste like a tabernacle” (273). The boy is a new kind of being, one that is 
unimaginable for the father. His father’s world “for him was not even a memory” (53-54). 
McCarthy makes it clear in the father’s description of the boy’s birth that this is no being we 
have encountered before: “Always so deliberate, hardly surprised by the most outlandish events. 
A creation perfectly evolved to meet its own end” (59). Moving past the father’s world of 
creation or evolutionary narratives, we might say that this boy is a new being ready to meet, not 
its end, but its posthuman existence.  
 While the father tries to map their existence, “The boy wouldn’t look” (86). “I always 
want to stop,” (93) the boy tells his father, interjecting his resistance to the life of continual 
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motion that is the modus operandi of McCarthy’s characters. When his father asks him to tell a 
story, the boy replies, “I dont have any stories to tell” (268). Furthermore, the way the boy 
relates to our concepts of death, time, dreams, and ethics reflects his posthuman shift from the 
world of his father to this new world.  
Death 
 The boy lives every moment in an awareness of death. He knows that death is inevitably 
coming to himself and to his father. When the boy acts rashly in his effort to get a glimpse of a 
little boy he thinks he sees, his father chastises him: “Do you want to die? Is that what you 
want?” (85). The boy replies “I dont care” (85). His apparent apathy may actually demonstrate 
that he desires some sort of death over his individual survival. He asks his father about death 
constantly: “Are we going to die now? (87). “If we were going to die would you tell me?” (94). 
“You think we’re going to die, dont you?” (100).  
 If McCarthy is engaging in a posthuman redefinition, then he may be opening up not only 
the definition of human life but also the definition of death. Death itself can be a humanistic 
boundary, marking the end of our conscious existence. Our concept of death is a part of our 
anthropocentric worldview. To think posthumanly, to understand the boy, we have to adjust this 
concept. In a more holistic ecological framework and a posthuman framework, what we call 
death is only a redistribution of our atoms into the rest of the world. We separate out but we do 
not end. For Bataille, death reveals the façade of living for what it is. Bataille writes, “Death is 
the great affirmer, the wonder-struck cry of life” (46). In death, Bataille finds the reaffirmation of 
that animal intimacy with the world instead of the closure of living. The boy has this broader 
concept of death, at least broader than his father’s concept of death. In the face of the dark 
reminders of destruction, piles of corpses, Pompeii-like friezes of burned people, the father sees 
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his son remain “So strangely untroubled” (191). When the father suggests that his son look away 
from the gory scene because it will become lodged in his head forever, the boy replies: “It’s okay 
Papa…They’re already there” (191). The boy is continuous with the gore of his world. He does 
not require his father’s, or readers’, pity.   
 The boy clearly sees death differently than his father, but there is another parental legacy 
of death in his life. The boy’s mother committed suicide sometime after the disaster that precedes 
the novel. Though we do not know exactly how old the boy was when his mother killed herself, 
we know that he is old enough to look at his father and ask, “She’s gone isn’t she?” when he 
realizes what his mother has done (58). His mother’s decision, much like the gory friezes, is not 
hidden from the boy. While the father lives in an abiding terror of death, his wife calls death her 
“new lover” (57). Dreamless, sorrowless, and numb to the world, she submits to “eternal 
nothingness” (57).  
 Drawing out the differences between the mother’s concept of death and the boy’s should 
help us understand what this posthuman redefinition of death is not. For the boy to have a 
different concept of death than his father has does not entail that he longs for death like his 
mother. Neither depiction of death matches the reality of this world. Because the boy recognizes 
continuity in death, he neither seeks it nor dreads it. Unlike his mother who is indifferent towards 
any other survivors, the son invests in the lives of those around him (Eli, the dog from the past, 
the “little boy,” his father) because they are all a part of him. The boy accepts living otherness.  
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Dreams 
 Unlike the father’s reoccurring dreams of past beauty, the boy seems only to dream of a 
darkness like that in which he lives. “I dont have good dreams anyway. They’re always about 
something bad happening,” he tells his father (269). One night, the boy’s dream becomes 
significantly conflated with reality. When he tells his father, “I was crying. But you didnt wake 
up,” his father apologizes. “I meant in the dream,” the boy corrects his father (183). This 
exchange demonstrates the continuity between the boy’s dreams and his reality. His father finds 
in the boy’s dark dreams some encouragement, as he acknowledges the difference between 
himself and his son:  
 When your dreams are of some world that never was or of some world that never will be 
 and you are happy again then you will have given up. Do you understand?  And you cant 
 give up. I wont let you. (189) 
 While the boy’s dreams are not colored with the beauty of his father’s dreams, McCarthy 
tells us: “The child had his own fantasies” (54). What we know of the child’s fantasies centers 
around his idea of another little boy. He is obsessed with the hope that somewhere, another little 
boy exists. The little boy, his double, symbolizes how life outside himself continues. This shows 
his involvement in the mesh of life outside him, in contrast to his mother’s indifference towards 
her own little boy. He also asks his father about Mars and the potential for life on another planet: 
“There could be people alive someplace else,” the boy says (244). These repeated thought 
experiments in life outside himself reveal that the boy is thinking the ecological thought, in 
Morton’s definition of it. The boy subsumes his individuality in order to increase his sense of life 
as a mesh.   
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 The boy has another noteworthy dream, a nightmare that he tries to share with his father. 
He dreams that a wind-up toy penguin approaches him without being wound up: “The winder 
wasnt turning” (37). This nightmare is significant because what the boy is encountering is 
arguably an animal, something he knows little to nothing about. A penguin that moves freely 
without a winder would simply be a living penguin, an animal as evidenced by the presence of 
motion without mechanical means. Perhaps the boy’s dream of animal reflects that whatever 
subconscious he possesses, unlike his father, includes more than his own memories or desires. In 
this dream, the boy imagines life that he does not recognize, but life that implicitly reminds him 
of his place in the world. In a small echo of Derrida’s meditation on the gaze of the animal, we 
might imagine that for this boy, the approach of a real penguin “offers to my sight the abysmal 
limit of the human” (12). Encountering the penguin without a sense of his own control (the 
winder) or even the dominion of a proper name for this being (animal), the boy experiences 
humbling placement in the world inside the gaze of this being. In contrast to the dreamed 
penguin, the troop of people that pass father and son later on the road are “marching with a 
swaying gait like wind-up toys” (91). The marching people represent humanism gone wrong, 
disconnected bodies that are only machines, running without the enmeshed identity of the boy. 
Between the dreamed penguin and the real wind-up beings stands the posthuman child, aware 
that his embodiment comes with belonging to the world as the animal does, like water in water, 
and unlike the robotic bodies of the other humanoids he sees (Bataille 24).  
Time 
 The boy’s life is directed towards survival. In this becoming- posthuman world, the 
anguish of philosophizing, fretting, thinking, planning is replaced for the boy by an in-the-
moment existence. Even in the book’s form we see this manifested. As Lincoln observes: “The 
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books unfolds…one foot or event after another” (168). Stylistically and thematically, the book 
forces us to be in the present with the boy, because in this new world, we cannot know or expect 
what will come next. In one of those spare moments of humor, the boy asks his father, “What are 
our long term goals?” (160). The boy’s question is humorous to us because we are deep enough 
into this world to realize that there is no “long term.” We know that even the idea of making 
“goals” echoes emptily in “the crushing black vacuum of the universe” (130). The boy 
remembers his father saying this phrase a long time ago. But the question dissolves in this age. 
Future and goals are not part of life now. In Bataille’s thinking, this means the father and son are 
giving up the idea of duration, which is what keeps humans in consciousness and separate from 
animal intimacy with the world. Thus, if they could lose the concept of future, duration, they 
could become more closely attuned to their new world. We begin to see this in the boy’s 
existence: “No list of things to be done. The day providential to itself. The hour. There is no 
later. This is later” (54).  
 The boy’s waning concern with time, duration, signals a movement into a less 
“conscious” existence. As posthumanism explains, consciousness becomes a curse not a 
blessing. Our human sense of time, the father’s memories, doom him to live in comparison. But 
the boy does not do this. Consciousness was “regarded as the seat of identity in Western 
tradition” (Hayles 3). But posthumanism understands that consciousness “is trying to claim it is 
the whole show when it is only a minor sideshow” (Hayles 3). Life greatly exceeds 
consciousness.  
Ethics 
 While his father lives by an older code of good guys and bad guys, with his son he 
simplifies all that we might call morality into one image: “we’re carrying the fire” (83). For the 
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father, the ethics associated with “carrying the fire” probably refers back to carrying “the seeds 
of civilization” (Wielenberg 3). The father carries the dying embers of humanism with him along 
the road. In one sense, it might seem that this is the same fire the boy carries. But the boy does 
not actually operate out of a system of ethics because this would be another form or ritual of 
human control in the world. Rather, the boy begins to live in the fire, as the wolf possessed inner 
fire, in an elemental communion with his world that is outside humans.  
 Reading the father’s moral code, we watch him wrestle to live in his “good guy” 
category. The father kills a man who threatens to harm the boy. He contemplates the potential 
virtue of killing himself and his son, as he imagines no worse evil than to leave his son in this 
dark world alone. But in the end, the father finds himself incapable of enacting such self-
destruction or the destruction of his only son: “I cant hold my dead son in my arms. I thought I 
could but I cant” (279). The father’s fire carrying boils down to an ethics with one clear limit: 
cannibalism. Throughout the novel, when the father and son encounter instances of cannibalism, 
they agree that they will never eat people. 
 Just as he is relatively unfazed by the death that surrounds him, the boy seems less 
shocked than his father by the people who do eat other people. After they find a storage room in 
a house filled with imprisoned people barely alive, he asks his father: “They’re going to kill 
those people, aren’t they? …They’re going to eat them, aren’t they?” (127). When his father 
confirms that they are indeed going to kill and eat their captives, the boy acknowledges: “And 
we couldnt help them because then they’d eat us too.” “Yes,” his father admits. “Okay,” the boy 
succinctly replies. Later the father and son discover the cooked corpse of a human infant. The 
boy buries his face against his father’s body. “Oh papa,” he says (198). But the boy’s apparent 
aversion to cannibalism might be nothing more than instinctual self-preservation. In the previous 
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passage, the boy’s calmness in the face of such seemingly grotesque acts suggests that, in spite of 
his father’s perseverance to refrain from cannibalism, the boy accepts this practice as continuous 
in existence. For Bataille, animals eating other animals demonstrate immanence. When animals 
eat one another, they live without hierarchy or transcendence from one another. In their 
“cannibalism,” they live “like water in water” (19). 
 The boy seems to remain loyal to his father’s creed: he does not eat people. And the 
survivor the boy encounters at the end confirms that he too refrains from cannibalism. The Road 
offers no suggestions that the boy will engage in this animal continuity by eating other people. 
Rather, he seems to remains true to his father’s limit. Perhaps this reveals a way that the boy’s 
becoming posthuman is incomplete, and he lapses back into the fire of old civilization by which 
his father leads him.  
 Though it is not like McCarthy to shy away from the most horrible conclusions, I also 
cannot help but wonder whether McCarthy is backing down from the conclusions towards which 
his novel leads. Does McCarthy refrain from accepting cannibalism in The Road because he 
wants to sell books? No one wants to read a version of The Road where the boy ends up 
becoming a cannibal, eating his dead father’s body at the end of the road. But posthumanism 
must by definition disconcert our humanness. Cannibalism as immanent, intimate existence so 
jarringly disrupts our human narratives that even this posthuman novel cannot house it. Perhaps 
the novel’s safe distance from the immanence of cannibalism reminds us that such existence 
cannot truly be present in these pages. 
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 “I’m not a retard,” the boy tells his father (252). His father asks him basic questions in an 
attempt to ensure that his son has not suffered any brain damage after several feverish days. The 
line elicits one of the few laughs we can get from this book. The humor is ironic. The boy’s 
sarcastic comment rings emptily in our ears because we know that the boy does not know what 
he says. Firstly, it seems unlikely that he has encountered any mentally retarded people in his 
life. Secondly, he has not socialized with any immature peers who would use this word in the 
derogatory way that he is using it. Thirdly, and most importantly to me, the boy does not live in a 
world that defines itself by mental capacity. It’s funny for him to him to distance himself from a 
“retard” because the posthuman boy need not differentiate with these categories.  
 Instead, the boy is able to enter a world apart from his father’s humanistic one. The 
darkness of his world leaves him “Mute as a stone” (66). Bataille explains how the animal’s 
inability to transcend itself offers it an immanence that has eluded mankind (23). Because the 
boy is a member of a world not built by language, history, religion— meaning-making elements 
of our humanity— he is able to exist more like a stone, in a world that does not revolve around 
himself, his mind, or his species. Stonehenge stands long after its original use expired into the 
unknown. Mountains of stone outlast the geographic names we give them. Even the paintings on 
those stone Lascaux caves last only because they were so aptly married to that material of 
independent stillness. When the boy becomes like a stone, this need not be a negative 
description; he is becoming more continuous with his world.   
 There are certainly moments in the book that call into question my hypothesis that this 
boy is a posthuman child. Although the boy’s world is ash, this does not stop him from 
producing art, which might initially strike the reader as a humanistic project. He colors on his 
mask, he plays a flute and plays with a toy truck. While he abandons many of these projects by 
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the end, they are nonetheless present in the story. His prayer of thanks to the dead for their 
leftover food reminds us of the forms that his father vigilantly maintained.  
 These artistic endeavors and a moment of old ritual lead me to a few possible 
conclusions. Firstly, we might see these moments as indicating that the boy is still haunted by the 
father’s humanistic work. We might see his metamorphosis into posthuman as incomplete. 
Secondly, rather than being incomplete, we might read in his humanistic lapses how this total 
loss of consciousness to achieve intimacy is impossible, or is possible only briefly. Thirdly, the 
boy’s art might show us that a posthuman world is still a world with art. Though the boy throws 
away his flute, he carries on a linguistic practice: he talks to his father. It seems significant that 
these words between father and son survive, since McCarthy wrote The Road for his own son. I 
will put off my thoughts on the paradox of posthuman art until the conclusion. But for now, I 
want to note that McCarthy might leave some regained value for words lingering in his 
posthuman world.  
  In an address to a conference in Knoxville, Jay Ellis concludes his analysis of The Road 
by seeing in the novel’s end “Hope beyond reason” (Ellis 38). Taking Ellis’s phrase quite 
literally, in this novel I see a hope outside of hopes we know. The only way to read the book’s 
end as hopeful is to acknowledge that the hope lies outside of our strictly human intelligence or 
vision, because the world is more than this. The fire of destruction becomes the fire of survival 
when it teaches us that life is more than a narcissistically human project.  
 To see the world in a posthuman way means not only to undo the meaning making 
strategies of the past, but to know that life goes on outside of the meaning we could make. While 
the novel follows the man and boy on the road, it does not end there. The survivor that meets the 
boy upon his father’s death explains that they must get off the road: “I don’t know how you 
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made it this far” (283). Roads are not taking us anywhere. Human life needs to become 
something other than a linear journey. Intimate existence in the world, off the road, is where 
survival is possible.  
 When the man is on the brink of death, he gazes at his son and sees him “looking back at 
him from some unimaginable future” (273). For the man, the boy’s world remains unimaginable. 
Perhaps even for McCarthy, it is unimaginable. The only inroads into the lives of these two we 
have comes through the father. Once he is gone, we are offered a brief vision of the boy’s 
survival, but that is all. Whatever the remaining posthuman lives become is outside the scope of 
the novel’s power to chronicle. 
 The Road’s final paragraph completely removes us from the human story. In a powerful 
ending, McCarthy writes, not about man, boy, or future, but about trout in the past: 
 Once there were brook trout in the streams in the mountains. You could see them 
 standing in the amber current where the white edges of their fins wimpled softly in the 
 flow. (286) 
Here the narrator seems to openly engage in the same kind of idealization of the past natural 
order that the father lived on through his dreams. What if this is simply the end of the dream of 
natural beauty that past humanistic rhetoric dreamed, embodied in the father? What if we finally 
get to shut such a book and survive with the boy? McCarthy tells us:  
 On their backs were vermiculate patterns that were maps of the world in its becoming. 
 Maps and mazes. Of a thing which could not be put back. Not be made right again. In the 
 deep glens where they lived all things were older than man and they hummed of mystery. 
 (287)  
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We cannot put back together the old humanity. The destruction, especially if we are to 
understand it as of human origin, is irreversible. Humanity’s maps expire and come apart like the 
man’s tattered map pieces, showing us the danger of trying to insert linear meaning into human 
life.  In fact, McCarthy’s connecting of the words “maps and mazes” forces us to juxtapose 
meaning-making direction and meaningless space. In this phrase, he unmakes our meanings, our 
past, into absurdity. Mystery, not meaning, prevails.    
 In another reading of this ending, those trout represent an intimate existence. This is the 
existence Bataille eloquently describes when he writes of how an animal is in the world like 
water in water, seamlessly a part of life (24). The trout are withstanding the current, at once 
exerting themselves against the flow while being a part of it. But because this cannot be made 
right, we sense that such intimacy is impossible. That space eternally taunts us, man or fish. Still 
we seek it. The boy lives in a different relationship with the world than his father; his deepened 
awareness of his part in the rest of life is evident. But the space remains.   
 In The Crossing, we see Billy’s father bent setting a trap for the wolf. We hear that to 
either Billy or the narrating eye, or both:  
 He looked to be truing some older, some subtler instrument. Astrolabe or sextant.  Like a 
 man bent at fixing himself someway in the world. Bent on trying by arch or chord the 
 space between his being and the world that was. If there be such space. If it be knowable. 
 (The Crossing 22)  
Such an image of narrowing this mysterious space between world and man comes to us again in 
The Road as the man stumbles upon on old sextant in the ship: “It was the first thing he’d seen in 
a long time that stirred him” (228) While the reader is not made fully aware of why this 
instrument moves the man, this passage from The Crossing gives us a clue. The mapping 
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instruments we make to give us our bearings in the world do quite the opposite. For McCarthy, 
the human attempts to try the space between himself and his world. Intimacy is what we crave, 
the collapse of this space. But such intimacy remains a mysterious impossibility in the human 
world of our making.  
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ENDINGS 
“The world has no name” 
 If we take this posthuman reading of Cormac McCarthy to its fullest realization, we must 
conclude that McCarthy’s novels cease to be novels at all. Though his books may be bound, 
published, sold, and read, they are anti-books. This radical unworking of the novel as a genre is 
evident in the plots, settings, characters, and general epistemology present in McCarthy’s 
“novels.”  
 First, as evidenced through Child of God especially, his novel’s narratives center around 
human beings while simultaneously refusing to center around human beings. Lester Ballard is 
the common thread running through the course of Child of God, but he does not generate this 
thread. We do not see a consistent flow of action from him, nor do the windows we get into his 
life serve to clarify our understanding of him. We see a few of his crimes, we go with him into an 
outhouse, a cave, a prison, and a store. But it is not necessarily Lester’s most important, 
unimportant, ethical, or unethical actions that occur in the pages of this novel. The sampling of 
Ballard’s activities we read is not just unnerving in its deviation from traditional ethics, but 
unnerving in its randomness. Likewise, in The Crossing, readers grab onto the familiar narrative 
of boy and animal, and the obstacles they must overcome on a journey home. But then, the boy 
kills the wolf, and wanders endlessly, with no home to which he can return. McCarthy’s plots 
refuse to be plots at all. Rather than orient us in his fictional worlds, they serve to disorient us.  
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 McCarthy captivates his readers with the way he writes about the world. There is no 
prose more gorgeous, more vatic, more striking, than that of McCarthy’s landscapes. In Blood 
Meridian we read:  
 The jagged mountains were pure blue in the dawn and everywhere birds twittered and the 
 sun when it rose caught the moon in the west so that they lay opposed to each other 
 across the earth, the sun whitehot and the moon a pale replica, as if they were the ends of 
 a common bore beyond whose terminals burned worlds past all reckoning. (86)  
Such a world is mesmerizing but not approachable. We recognize mountains, birds, the sun and 
the moon, but their sharp and polarizing existences do not invite us in. The experience of reading 
these landscapes in McCarthy can feel more like an encounter with a storm than with a page. 
Such an experience testifies yet again to the radical unworking of these novels. For, just as the 
narrative’s plots disorient us, so McCarthy’s settings are places in which we cannot exist. His 
world entices us while also expelling us. His spaces are simultaneously lush and desolate, 
gorgeous and horrifying, and in such paradoxical creation, McCarthy unweaves the fabric of his 
settings. As Bourassa writes:  
 The greatness and much-praised beauty of McCarthy’s landscapes is that they are  not 
 settings, not geography, not obstacles. In fact, properly speaking, they are not: they 
 escape being… (75)  
Novels should build places that are real in the sense that we can successfully enter them as 
readers. McCarthy’s settings offer no such entry.  
 Furthermore, the protagonists of McCarthy’s writing become something other than 
humans. If the novel is, as Bourassa cogently argues, a fundamentally human enterprise, then we 
are forced to conclude that these are not novels. Bourassa captures this when he writes: “There is 
   
     86 
no story without the human, no human without the stories” (18). Thus, as Lester Ballard, Billy 
Parham, and the boy, become posthuman, their stories cease to be stories at all.  
 Finally, McCarthy’s novels undercut the philosophy of the novel. We traditionally read 
novels under the assumption that we live lives of story. We believe that these fictional stories 
will offer insight, escape, parallels, or criticisms of our stories. This is the entire premise of 
Christianity: that we should enter our story into the story of God in his word the Bible and his 
Word, his son. Such an understanding of the novel’s meaning casts the human as the protagonist 
in the world’s story. In contrast, McCarthy’s novels would imply that we do not know the world, 
or ourselves, through stories. Sevier County fails to understand their world when they cage it in 
stories. Billy Parham likewise steps out of reality for McCarthy when he reads the wolf into his 
story. The father in The Road endangers his son when he tries to give him a world of stories. The 
storytellers in The Crossing, like McCarthy himself, say between the lines of their own tales that 
to know the world in a story is not to know the world at all. “The world has no name,” thus the 
world cannot be a story (Crossing 387).  
 Novels for McCarthy, like those yellowing photographs the gypsy father hangs above his 
cart in The Crossing, are heretical to the reality of the world: “In their images they had thought to 
find some small immortality but oblivion cannot be appeased” (TC 58). In The Road, our 
narrator muses: “Do you think that your fathers are watching? That they weigh you in their 
ledgerbook? Against what? There is no book and your fathers are dead in the ground” (106). 
Here is one of McCarthy’s clearest strikes against an epistemology of stories, the basis of the 
novel’s power. McCarthy’s speaker sets up our expectation as readers: using history, the stories 
of people from our past, we weigh our actions in books. But for McCarthy, “there is no book,” at 
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least no book with this weighty of a meaning. In McCarthy’s hands, the novel becomes a self-
destructing case against an epistemology of story.  
 Does McCarthy ultimately contradict himself, if he must use books to communicate the 
limits of books? Have we really gotten around this paradox of the posthuman artist? I think we 
have not, and I think we should not. Here’s why. The refreshment of the human that Wolfe’s 
posthumanism calls for is a paradoxical transformation. The “self-recovery” at the end of the 
thought experiment, for Wolfe, is a paradox: “The achievement of the self is now seen not as an 
active willing but as a maximally (and paradoxically) active passivity” (262). In other words, the 
posthuman is not a being but a becoming, an absence of the active being (cogito ergo sum). 
When discussing the poetry of Wallace Stevens, Wolfe finally gets at the poignancy in the 
paradox of posthuman art:  
 The fact that observation is multiple, contingent, and paradoxical in its self-
 reference…cannot be overcome, and it’s a good thing too. It both creates and partakes in 
 a world that is “imperfect,” that “lies in flawed words and stubborn sounds,” because the 
 world is thus riven by paradoxical difference…that can never add up to the “simplified” 
 “world of white and snowy scents.” (Wolfe 281)   
Cormac McCarthy goes after the dangerous manner in which we try to control the world through 
our language. We are doing violence to reality, including ourselves, when we imagine that we 
can simplify it into the map of our language. No, what is real is another world entire than that of 
words; it is “what cannot be held” (Crossing 127). So the best language will remain deeply 
entrenched in paradox, which allows for the multiplicity of abundant life outside it. And such 
language can build novels that, like McCarthy’s, unwrite our old clarity.  
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 To close, this excerpt from a poem by Robinson Jeffers concisely communicates the 
paradoxical work of McCarthy’s posthuman writing. Jeffers describes how the so-called death of 
the human actually invigorates and frees the human:  
 I am not dead, I have only become inhuman 
 That is to say,  
 Undressed myself of laughable prides and infirmities, 
 But not as a man 
 Undresses to creep into bed, but like an athlete 
 Stripping for the race. 
 The delicate ravel of nerves that made me a measurer 
 Of certain fictions 
 Called good and evil; that made me contract with pain 
 And expand with pleasure; 
 Fussily adjusted like a little electroscope: 
 That’s gone, it is true, 
 (I never miss it; if the universe does, 
 How easily replaced!) 
 But all the rest is heightened, widened, set free. (372)  
“Basking nighthawks” rise from the ending of Child of God, and the “sun did rise, once again” at 
the close of The Crossing (197, 426). Along with the brook trout at The Road’s end, “standing in 
the amber current where the white edges of their fins wimpled softly in the flow,” these endings 
all bear witness to the freedom that comes at the end of ourselves (286).  
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